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Does Ameri can In dian Law Re flect 
In dian Val ues?
A Study on Na tive Ameri can Iden tity
MONICA VLAD
”The right of abo rigi nal peo ples like the Na tive 
Ameri cans or the Maori in New Zea land eroded with 
time, not be cause the wrong done to them is wiped out 
(it may well grow greater, with in creas ingly dele te ri-
ous ef fects on their com mu nal life) but be cause the pos-
si bil ity no longer ex ists for the res to ra tion of any thing 
re motely re sem bling their for mer in de pend ence.“
Mi chael WALZER1
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT NATIVE AMERICAN IDENTITY.
THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION.
Such sub ject – if an in sight into its whole com plex ity is truly ever pos si ble – in-
volves a sense of per plex ity about the hu man race it self. The use of phi loso phi cal 
terms would ex press the idea of Na tive Ameri can Iden tity more suc cess fully, 
given the lim its im posed on value judge ments by the le gal lan guage.
If one goes back to Mi chael Wal zer’s state ment, one might find that the com-
pari son be tween in dige nous peo ples and en dan gered spe cies is not that out of 
place. This ap proach of sa cred re spect for the (still unkown)2 re searched as pects 
might bring us closer to an ap pro pri ate view about the first peo ples’ lives, as the 
sci ence of an thro pol ogy teaches us3.
In de scrib ing and ana lyz ing as pects of in dige nous peo ples’ iden tity, one has 
to cope with a con stant dif fi culty. Many of them might es cape from our ca pac ity to 
ra tion al ize, start ing with their un der stand ing about life it self.
I feel my self far from un der stand ing this fun da men tal fas ci na tion, liv ing in a 
time in which ”tra di tional In di ans have tended to pros ti tute their own knowl edge 
by mak ing it avail able to the wan der ing scholar, the ex cited groupie, and the cu ri-
ous film maker and writer”4. If one thinks over the sad ness of this re mark, one 
1 ”The New Tribalism”, in O. DAHBOUR, M. ISHAV (eds.), The Nationalism Reader, Huma-
nities Press, New Jersey, 1997, p. 326.
2 When writing this, I have at least two aspects in mind: one is the problem of access to this 
type of knowledge; the other derives from it and cannot be said clearer than in the words of 
Bobby Billie (Independent Traditional Seminole Nation): ”Other cultures can explain; but we 
have to keep everything for ourselves“. (See Bobby Billie’s talk at the Miami University Law 
School conference on ”Sacred Sites and Modern Lives”, February 2000). 
3 An insight on this fascination can be found in the book of Julian BURGER, The Gaia Atlas 
of First Peoples, Anchor, London, 1990.
4 Vine DELORIA Jr., Clifford M. LYTLE, The Nations Within. The Past and Future of American 
Indian Sovereignty, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1998, p. 254. 
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might con clude that the chance for Ameri can In dian cul tural in teg rity to day is 
highly at risk. ”Liv ing cul ture” is so much part of a peo ple that it is ”vir tu ally in ca-
pa ble of rec og ni tion and for mal aca demic trans mis sion”1. Such state ments are 
true es pe cially for a civi li za tion like the In dian one, proba bly apoc ry phal to our un-
der stand ing even to day.
There is a deep truth in this state ment, and fur ther re flec tion might stop the 
ini tia tive to ex plore this com plex ity.
But one could choose to ac cept that es says like this one may, at least, il lu mi-
nate fur ther ques tions. It is due to the 1972 In dian Edu ca tion Act and to its pro vi-
sions for teach ing In dian cul ture and his tory, but in par ticu lar to the ac cess to this 
area of law (since it is taught at Ameri can Uni ver sity, Wash ing ton Col lege of Law 
dur ing the 1998-1999 aca demic year, for which I pre pare this study) that I had the 
chance to come closer to this re search topic. From this point of view, the goal of 
this pa per is to (hope fully) es cape from the risk of re duc ing tribal cul ture to a ”text-
book phe nom ena”.
This adds tre men dous need for an in ter dis ci pli nary per spec tive on the is sues 
de scribed. Among these, the in ter fer ence of law with other nor ma tive dis ci plines, 
but also with de scrip tive and ex plana tory ones (his tory, an thro pol ogy, po liti cal sci-
ence) has to be con sid ered in the first place. Such ap proach is nec es sary in or der to 
gain a mini mum of un der stand ing of the many is sues con cerned, since ”no area of 
fed eral law is more com pli cated or re quires more ex per tise than fed eral In dian 
law”2. This is true not only be cause of the hun dreds of trea ties, thou sands of stat-
utes, and hun dreds of thou sands of ad min is trat ing rul ings and ac tions that are in-
volved in fed eral In dian law, nor only be cause of the over six hun dred sepa rate 
In dian com mu ni ties that are de pend ent in some man ner on the va ga ries of in ter pre-
ta tion of fed eral In dian law or the ”lit er ally bil lions of dol lars and the lives of over a 
mil lion peo ple” that are at stake in In dian cases3, but it is merely true be cause, every 
time when In dian is sues are in volved, one has to bear in mind that a dif fer ent, still 
un known civi li za tion is in volved, for which rights are tools of cul tural sur vival.
Such com plex ity makes us aware of the ne ces sity to con vert the lan guage of 
our un der stand ing in or der to make it more re cep tive to the – for us – still un dis-
cov ered world of In dian civi li za tion. If it is true that ”no na tion has ever im posed 
the moral de mands on it self that Amer ica has”, and if ”no coun try has so tor-
mented it self over the gap be tween its moral val ues, which are by defi ni tion ab so-
lute, and the im per fec tion in her ent in the con crete situa tions to which they must 
be ap plied”4, then Amer ica really has to see in the fed eral pol icy to wards the In di-
ans (and in the le gal cases that ac com pa nied this pol icy over time) the de gree of tol-
er ance the Ameri can le gal sys tem was/is ca pa ble of.
In tol er ance was de fined by Han nah Ar endt as the in ca pac ity to ac cept the dif-
fer ence as such (and I can hardly think of a more com plex defi ni tion). Within this 
frame work, pos si ble an swers to the so dif fer ent val ues that are in volved while 
deal ing with In dian is sues can be found if one ana lyzes the evo lu tion of the le gal 
sys tem with re gard to the In di ans, mean while com ment ing on their long-run 
im pli ca tions. At least two as pects com pli cate such in ves ti ga tion: the val ues of 
1 Ibidem, p. 250.
2 Ibidem, p. 265.
3 Ibidem.
4 Henry KISSINGER, Diplomacy, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994, p. 23.
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colo nial and fed er al ist Amer ica, as de fined by her self, and the very lit tle in sight 
into the In dian’s civi li za tion that ac com pa nied this proc ess1.
The start ing point of this analy sis is in spired by Tho mas Ber ger’s sim ple re-
mark: ”Make no mis take”, he writes in his ”Epi logue” to ”A Long and Ter ri ble 
Shadow. White Val ues, Na tive Rights in the Ameri cas”, ”they (the Ameri can In di-
ans) are peo ple of our time”2. None the less, judg ments that have been made about 
cer tain In dian com mu ni ties at a spe cific mo ment in time have of ten been ex tended 
or gen er al ized for other pe ri ods of time and have been ap plied to dif fer ent In dian 
com mu ni ties, and to day it is hard, if not im pos si ble, to find an an swer to the con cern 
whether ”it could have been dif fer ent, if…“. With this in mind, two ques tions arise:
Yes, they are peo ple of our time – but how can we deal with the ob vi ous re al-
ity that, to day, they are strang ers in their own land? And, more fun da men tally, 
how we can deal with the im pli ca tions of an older di lemma: by what right does 
one race im pose its laws and in sti tu tions upon an other?
A ten ta tive an swer first has to seek a dis tinc tion be tween this ques tion as a 
trauma caused by the per pet ual and gen eral prob lem of domi na tion in hu man his-
tory, and by its im pli ca tions for a par ticu lar situa tion of in dige nous peo ples. As to 
the later, the ini tial ques tion is dou bled by an is sue that comes closer to Ameri can 
In dian iden tity: How does one peo ple, one race, jus tify the tak ing of the lands of 
an other peo ple, an other race?3
To day, one is aware that the In di ans’ rights have been eroded in time to such 
an ex tent, that ideas like ”res to ra tion of tribal au thor ity” (a con cept that is un-
avoid ably linked to the land) sound like an ab stract specu la tion, rather than like 
a se ri ous mat ter. But this is only one side of a com plex prob lem. The ap proach to-
wards dif fer ence has per haps hardly changed to day. One has to go no fur ther than 
con sid er ing the ”dis con cert ing re ac tion the av er age Ameri can on va ca tion out 
west” has, while sud denly en coun ter ing a sign, that pro claims that the high way is 
en ter ing ”an In dian na tion”4. For the Ameri can (self-re gard ing) un der stand ing, 
”na tions” are ”pref era bly an ocean away”, for all the hus tle of mod ern and in sti tu-
tional life. The av er age Ameri can will most proba bly not be aware of how dra mati-
cally in sti tu tions shape hu man per son al ity – here in cluded the ap proach to wards 
edu ca tion and the ac cess to knowl edge gen er ally. More over, the chance for a real 
un der stand ing is di min ished by the very fact that to day Ameri can eth nic groups 
gen er ally face a cri sis of au then tic ity, in the sense that cul tural pat terns, once rooted 
in the exi gen cies of life, ap pear to be dys func tional: eth nic ity be comes sym bolic, 
and thus cul tur ally thin5. Unlike ”other Ameri can eth nic groups”6, Indi ans have 
1 It has been argued – at least with regard to Indian law before discovery – that the mainly 
oral character of Indian customs made them difficult to know. Such perspective does not go 
beyond Euro-centric assumptions.
2 Thomas BERGER, A Long and Terrible Shadow. White Values, Native Rights in the Americas, 
University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1992, p. 160.
3 This is, unfortunately such a severe moral question, that it remains unanswered today. 
4 Vine DELORIA Jr., Clifford M. LYTLE, The Nations Within...cit., p. 1. 
5 In his writings, Charles Taylor has addressed the question of ”multiculturalism” in western 
societies in an exhaustive manner. I do believe that these types of societies do not know what 
they deal with while addressing the demands of ”multi-ethnicity”. Assimilation by the dominant 
knowledge system leads to the same sort of homogeneity as monoculturalization, but it does so 
in a different way.
6 Before further description, it is vital to underline here how important terminology is. There 
always is a conceptual meaning beyond semantics, and ”ethnic terminology” is especially a 
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pre served the idea of na tion hood through out their pe riod of con tact with the 
non-In dian world but have had great dif fi culty com mu ni cat ing the es sence of 
what they be lieve to the lar ger so ci ety. It has, there fore, been com fort able to con-
sider the In di ans’ per cep tion about them selves as na tions noth ing more than 
”some primi tive de lu sion of gran deur that has cer tainly been erased by his tory”1.
Per haps no other po liti cal re la tion ship in the world re veals the fact, that mod-
ern so cial re al ity and his tori cal po liti cal re al ity are rarely con so nant as much as the 
”In dian tribes-fed eral gov ern ment” re la tion ship does. Ameri can In di ans are 
unique in the world in that they ”rep re sent the only abo rigi nal peo ples still prac tic-
ing a form of self-gov ern ment in the midst of a wholly new and mod ern civi li za-
tion that has been trans ported to their lands”2. But this very re al ity has forced the 
In di ans to con front sa cred ness and util ity3. With the lit tle in sight into the au then-
tic In dian world that is pos si ble to day, non-In di ans can hardly un der stand the In-
dian no tion of ”sa cred ness”. As to their un der stand ing about ”util ity”, this has to 
be per ceived within the para doxi cal lan guage of a trag edy: the trade with tra di-
tions and val ues, for the sake of sur vival, that goes back to the trea ties be tween the 
fed eral gov ern ment and the tribes.
Since to day there are many dif fer ences in the In dian world, there is a risk of 
over gen er ali za tion that can hardly be avoided. There are landed and land less 
tribes, large and small tribes, east ern and west ern tribes, ”fed er ally rec og nized” 
and ”non-fed er ally rec og nized” and ter mi nated tribes, res er va tion and ur ban In di-
ans, ”tra di tional” and ”more mod ern” In di ans. But the con fron ta tion of these op-
po site con cepts within the tribal psy che is char ac ter is tic for all, and it is per haps 
eased only by the In di ans’ per cep tion about time: ”re li gious gifts of power seem 
not to be eter nal but only used within this par ticu lar frag ment of cos mic time”, 
and ”an cient teach ings in form In di ans that the true mark of a civi li za tion is its abil-
ity to live in a lo ca tion with a mini mum dis rup tion of its fea tures”4. How dra matic 
”complex and sensitive matter”. It has been argued that ”American Indian” is a European 
denomination and Indians on the reservations most often refer to Native people in general as 
”Indians”. However, the terms ”Indian”, ”American Indian” and ”Native American” are all 
widely used by both Indian and non-Indian scholars, as are some less common terms, such as 
”Amerindian”, ”aboriginal Americans” and ”Natives” (the latter being generally used to refer to 
indigenous Alaskan groups such as Inuits or Aleuts in both the United States and Canada). As 
Robert White wrote in 1990, it seems that the Native Americans ”perhaps feel that a misnomer 
applied to their ancestors more than five hundred years ago by an Italian adventurer is the least 
of their concerns”. Still, it is pertinent to quote here that ”the false terminology used against us 
(the American Indians) is so pervasive that any of its words call up the (false) idea of ’Indian-ness’. 
The word ’tribe’ comes from the three peoples who originally founded Rome (’Tribunal’, based 
on the number three, comes from the same root). It is not a descriptive word, nor a scientific one. 
Its use in anthropology has been completely discredited, and came from the European concept of 
human progress at the pinnacle of which were the capitals of Europe. ”Tribe”, ”chief”, and 
similar words do not describe a part of reality for any people. They are descriptive only within 
the discourse of enclosure and concealment, for purposes of fabricating impressions of relative 
primitiveness. See Jimmie DURHAM, ”Cowboys and … Notes on Art, Literature and American 
Indians in the Modern American Mind”, in M. Annette JAIMES (ed.), The State of Native America, 
Beacon Press, Boston, 1992, p. 433. 
1 Ibidem, p. 1.
2 Vine DELORIA Jr., Clifford M. LYTLE, The Nations Within...cit., p. 2. 
3 Such association must seem grotesque to the Native Americans, if not impossible.
4 Ibidem, p. 1. 
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this con fron ta tion was and still is for the In dian com mu ni ties is re vealed by the dif-
fer ence be tween In dian civi li za tion, on one hand, and the Euro pean-Ameri can 
civi li za tion that has im posed its val ues on the for mer.
The ir re me di able ef fects of this proc ess of im po si tion can not be de scribed, in 
any case not in a sci en tific pa per1. Still, a sci en tific pa per has to men tion at least the 
most sig nifi cant as pects of this on go ing phe nome non.
This means to men tion, in the first place, that for in dige nous peo ples know-
ing means valu ing. On the other hand, the as sump tion, that knowl edge is ”value 
free” makes the sub stance of the ”melt ing pot” con cept (a no tion which is, it self, a 
con sti tu tive myth of the United States)2. But it is es sen tial to note here that re spect 
is a cog ni tive vir tue, and that there can be no re spect where there is no un der stand-
ing3. Also, the in stru men tal re duc tion of what is in trin si cally valu able lies at the 
heart of dis re spect. This par ticu larly ap plies here to the situa tion of in dige nous 
peo ples of the West ern hemi sphere4. If we can ig nore that ”sa cred ness goes out of 
eve ry thing”, that one ”can not take life with out a re cip ro cal of fer ing”, then the ”im-
pe ri alist pre ten sion to uni ver sal ity made on be half of the West ern knowl edge sys-
tem and the to tal in abil ity of its ad her ents to re gard com pet ing sys tems with 
any thing but con tempt”5 in vades in our lives.
More over, a most wide-spread and cur rent phe nome non can be best de-
scribed in Re nato Rosaldo’s words:
”The agents of co lo ni al ism yearn for what they them selves have al-
tered or trans formed. This ’nos tal gia’ has a para doxi cal ele ment to it: some-
one de lib er ately al ters a form of life, and then re grets that things have not 
re mained as they were prior to the in ter ven tion. At one re move, peo ple 
de stroy their en vi ron ment, and then they wor ship na ture. In any of its ver-
sions, im pe ri al ist nos tal gia uses a pose of ’in no cent yearn ing’ both to cap-
ture peo ple’s imagi na tion and to con ceal its com plic ity with of ten bru tal 
domi na tion”6 .
Mean while, within the ”Other’s” world, the pur pose of the In dian way of 
know ing was to keep whole things whole, “be cause only when they are whole is 
the liv ing pres ence, the soul or spirit, really there”7.
Un avoid ably, the analy sis brings us back to the times of Euro pean dis cov ery 
and con quest. Fur ther con sid era tions will de scribe the so cial and le gal is sues re-
lated to this as pect.
1 This would be similar to pretending that a tragedy could be understood if expressed in a 
manner different than an artist would choose. 
2 See Siegfried WIESNER, ”!Esa India! Latcrit Theory and the Place of Indigenous Peoples 
within Latina/o Communities”, University of Miami Law Review, vol. 53, no. 4, July 1999, p. 836. 
3 Laurie Anne WHITT, ”Indigenous Peoples and the Cultural Politics of Knowledge”, in 
Michael K. GREEN (ed.), Issues in Native American Cultural Identity, Peter Lang, New York, 1995, 
p. 241.
4 Although my article is limited to exploring the situation of Native Americans in the United 
States. 
5 Laurie Anne WHITT, ”Indigenous Peoples...cit.”, p. 236. 
6 See Renato ROSALDO, Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis, Beacon Press, 
Boston, 1989, p. 70. 
7 Ibidem, p. 249.
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ATTEMPT AT AN INSIGHT INTO INDIAN’S
PERCEPTIONS ABOUT SOCIETY AND LAW
”There was never a draft in In dian so ci ety”
Vine DELORIA
It is ob vi ous that first con tacts with Euro pe ans shocked both the In di ans and 
the ex plor ers. If one con sid ers the In dian nick names for whites – ”peo ple who 
take or ders” or ”peo ple who march in a straight line” – one might have an in sight 
into the pow er ful dif fer ence be tween the two con fronted worlds. To the In di ans, it 
seemed that the ”whites” hat sur ren dered ”all mor als sub stance in ex change for se-
cu rity in the ano nym ity of in sti tu tional life”1.
One can per ceive this fun da men tal dif fer ence by first look ing at the idea 
about ”peo ple” in In dian so ci ety. For the In dian com mu ni ties, the ”peo ple” is pri-
mar ily a re li gious con cep tion, and it be gins some where in the pri mor dial mists. 
Tribal names re flect the be lief that these par ticu lar peo ples have been cho sen from 
among vari ous peo ples of the uni verse (in clud ing mam mals, birds and rep tiles) to 
hold ”a spe cial re la tion ship” with the higher pow ers. Thus most tribal names can 
be in ter preted sim ply to mean ”the peo ple”.
Given the In di ans’ per cep tion about cos mic har mony, the tribes un der stood 
their place in the uni verse as one given spe cifi cally to them2. There fore they had 
no need to evolve spe cial po liti cal in sti tu tions to shape and or der their so ci ety. All 
that was needed was a coun cil at which eve ry one could speak, and at which peo-
ple were re minded of their ”sa cred du ties to the cos mos and to them selves”.
Dif fer ence is also ob vi ous if one con sid ers that the most im por tant so cial/po-
liti cal po si tions of lead er ship in tribes de pended upon the per sonal pres tige and 
cha risma of the in di vid ual. Quali fi ca tions were pri mar ily those of per sonal in teg-
rity and hon esty. Due to such per cep tion, it is not sur pris ing that ”most In di ans 
had lit tle re spect for white mili tary lead ers who com manded their sol diers to go to 
war while re main ing safely in the rear”3. In turn, it was the more dif fi cult for whites 
to con clude that chiefs had some mys ti cal but ab so lute power over the mem bers of 
the tribe. This dif fer ent ap proach on au thor ity be came trans par ent in ex cep tional 
mo ments, such as war: not ing that the In di ans would fight with great vigor un til 
their leader was killed, and their spirit for the fight de clined upon death of the war 
chief, the whites might have un der stood that this kind of in flu ence went ”far be-
yond that of the he redi tary Euro pean mon archs over their sub jects”4.
The ex traor di nary dif fi culty In di ans and Euro pe ans had in un der stand ing 
each other’s val ues is par ticu larly ap pli ca ble to le gal is sues. The im po si tion of in di-
vid ual val ues on In dian tribes con trib uted greatly to the ero sion of their iden tity. 
While Euro-Ameri can civi li za tion cre ated/cre ates a ped es tal for the in di vid ual 
and for in di vidu al is tic val ues, the tribal soli dar ity and the shared sense of ex is-
tence that emerges from this is the very mo dus vivendi for In di ans. An over view on 
1 Vine DELORIA Jr., Clifford M. LYTLE, The Nations Within...cit., p. 8.
2 From this perspective, one can have a better understanding about the trauma of dislocation 
caused by the removal policy.
3 Ibidem, p. 9. 
4 Ibidem, p. 10.
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the evo lu tion of the Ameri can le gal doc trines that are ap pli ca ble to In di ans shows 
the mul ti ple con se quences this dif fer ent per cep tions have had over time, es pe-
cially when it comes to the ero sion of In di ans’ rights.
The most pro found ele ment that dis tin guishes In dian ways of gov ern ing 
from Euro pean/Ameri can forms is the fact that ”non-In di ans have tended to 
write down and re cord all the prin ci ples and pro ce dures that they be lieved es sen-
tial to the for ma tion and op era tion of a gov ern ment”, while the In di ans – bene fit-
ing from re li gious, cul tural, so cial and eco nomic ho mo ge ne ity in their tribal 
so cie ties – had no need to for mal ize their po liti cal in sti tu tions by de scrib ing them 
in a docu ment1. Within tribal so cie ties, au thor ity did not de pend on the writ ten 
form of rules, nor on their com pul sory en force ment.
An other ba sic dif fer ence is that in In dian com mu ni ties vio la tion of the cus-
toms in volved ac tion by the com mu nity to en force its rules. The tribe, meet ing in 
coun cil, “dis cussed the vio la tion and called upon its knowl edge of prece dents in 
com mu nity his tory which were fac tu ally close to the in ci dent un der con sid era-
tion”2. The le gal de ci sion was de vised to re flect the best so lu tion for the com mu nity 
at that time, and there fore not al ways de pend ent upon fol low ing the for mer reso-
lu tion of the prob lem. Given this flexi bil ity, there was n o need to for mu late a rigid 
set of laws an even lit tle in cli na tion to make prece dents ab so lute in the same way 
that the An glo-Saxon tra di tion found nec es sary3.
It is, there fore, to tally in ade quate to ap ply and/or ex tend Euro-Ameri can con-
cepts of Pub lic Law, in clud ing the very idea of the so cial con tract the ory of gov ern-
ment it self, to the In dian com mu ni ties or to tribal so cie ties gen er ally. In dian tribal 
so cie ties had no con cept of civil rights: there was no need for limi ta tion of the ar bi-
trary au thor ity over in di vidu als, since every mem ber of the so ci ety was re lated, 
by blood or clan re spon si bili ties, to every other mem ber. There was no fear of gov-
ern ment in tru sion within the In dian com mu ni ties, in the sense per ceived by 
Euro-Ameri cans, be cause there was no such con cept as ”each citi zen stand ing on 
an equal foot ing with every other citi zen”.
From this per spec tive, one might un der stand why – for in stance – the pass ing 
of the In dian Civil Rights Act re quired tribal in sti tu tions to be come a for mal in sti tu-
tion more com pletely re sem bling the fed eral struc tures than the ”tribal gov ern-
ment it self re sem bled ei ther the state or the fed eral gov ern ments”. The very es sence 
of the de struc tion it brought to the In dian world can be sum ma rized as fol lows:
”Tra di tional In dian so ci ety un der stood it self as a com plex of re spon si-
bili ties and du ties. The In dian Civil Rights Act merely trans formed this be-
lief into a so ci ety based on rights against the gov ern ment and elimi nated any 
sense of re spon si bil ity that the peo ple might have felt for one an other”4.
As long as peo ple did not have to con front each other be fore their com mu nity 
(which was es sen tial for their sense of jus tice) but ”only to file suit in tribal court”, 
it is clear how far the ef fects of the In dian Civil Rights Act were from its pur pose.
What the In di ans were and are seek ing for is a pol icy (and a le gal ba sis de-
rived form that pol icy) that would con firm their long-cher ished be lief that they 
1 Ibidem, pp. 17-18.
2 Ibidem, p. 18.
3 Ibidem.
4 Ibidem, pp. 213-214. 
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con sti tuted na tions as surely as France and Eng land con sti tuted na tions. The heart 
of this is sue leads to a gen eral con clu sion: the very per cep tion that In di ans are an 
”eth nic mi nor ity” is fun da men tally wrong in its early le gal and po liti cal set tings, 
as well as in its long-term con se quences. From their per spec tive, the civil rights 
idea was only ”fit for specu la tion by lib er als that who saw all mi nori ties as con sti-
tut ing the same ’do mes tic’ prob lem”1.
While Euro pe ans and Ameri cans had and have a hard time un der stand ing In-
dian le gal con cepts and cus toms, the dif fi culty of com mu ni ca tion is in creased by 
the fact that re li gious be liefs and cul tural pat terns (in other words, cru cial as pects 
of iden tity) have pre vented In di ans from or ga niz ing them selves so cially or po liti-
cally in a fash ion fa mil iar and ac cept able to Euro pean minds. This might be the rea-
son why, al though tra di tional In dian norms and struc tures, as well as their mod ern 
coun ter parts in tribal con sti tu tions and codes, are ”In dian laws”, but they are not 
the pri mary fo cus of fed eral In dian law.
There is a ”long step” from a group of peo ple liv ing on an un dis turbed an un-
dis cov ered con ti nent to the im mensely com pli cated ”net work of res er va tions” that 
pres ently con sti tutes the home lands of the Ameri can In di ans. The long his tory in-
volved di ver gent paths of the ory, still in ter sect ing in com pletely un ex pected ways. 
To day, In di ans are still con sid ered to be ”dif fer ent”, even ”uniquely dif fer ent” – 
and they are treated as such by the ”great est of all egali tar ian so cie ties”.
Le gal is sues are one part of this – once again – im mensely com pli cated re al ity.
But leav ing aside the (un de ni able) dif fi cul ties as so ci ated with law and time, 
an ”an cient feel ing of sov er eignty” and its re con sti tu tion goes to the very heart of 
In dian iden tity. Con cepts like sov er eignty have to be con sid ered in the first place 
if one tries to find the high est level of ab strac tion, that would still be ap pli ca ble to 
all In dian com mu ni ties. This is true be cause of the pri macy of land in the In dian 
world. As land was alien ated, all other forms of so cial co he sion also be gan to 
erode, land hav ing been the con text in which the other forms have been cre ated2.
Dif fer ent le gal doc trines have been cre ated in or der to jus tify – both le gally 
and mor ally – this pri mor dial alien ation of In dian lands, that de stroyed the very 
es sence of their sov er eignty. It has been ar gued that ”the bal ance of power re duces 
the op por tu ni ties for us ing force; a shared sense of jus tice re duces the de sire to use 
force”3. The achieve ment of this bal ance of power is es pe cially com pli cated with 
re gard to In dian is sues – and this is be cause of the dif fi cul ties in de fin ing ”a shared 
sense of jus tice”. If one tries to ex plore the depth of de struc tion in dige nous peo-
ples’ world had to suf fer, it is likely that this state ment will loose any sense be-
cause of its very con tra dic tion. And given the lit tle in sight one has into the world 
of au then tic val ues in in dige nous peo ples’ way of life, it be comes even more dif fi-
cult to de fine what ”to do them jus tice” means to day.
None the less, it is to day that such is sues are ana lyzed by phi loso phers like 
Bruce Ac ker man. It is a mat ter of fun da men tal re flec tion to quote them here, be-
fore go ing on into fur ther con sid era tions of sov er eignty:
1 Ibidem, p. 206.
2 The precedent considerations and quotations follow Erica Irene Daes, Special Rapporteur 
of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
Chairperson of the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples, Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous 
Peoples, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 1997. 
3 Henry KISSINGER, Diplomacy, cit., p. 79. 
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”It is a tempt ing pros pect which be comes more se duc tive as my ef fec-
tive power in creases […] Power cor rupts: the more power I have, the more I 
can lose by try ing to an swer the ques tion of le giti macy; the more power I 
have, the greater the chance that my ef fort at sup pres sion will suc ceed [...] 
Yet I hope to take the ques tion of le giti macy se ri ously:
What would our so cial world look like if no one ever sup pressed an-
other’s ques tion of le giti macy, where every ques tioner met with a con sci en-
tious at tempt at an an swer [...]?”1.
THE DILEMMA OF SOVEREIGNTY
While de scrib ing the idea of In dian na tions’ sov er eignty, one has again to be 
aware of the very dif fer ent mean ings the lan guage we use im plies. What is spe-
cifi cally meant here is that the same lan guage in vokes dif fer ent, of ten in com pati-
ble val ues.
Sov er eignty has pro voked tre men dous phi loso phi cal and/or po liti cal writ-
ings and de bates over time. It has very dif fer ent un der stand ings – and value – in dif-
fer ent civi li za tions and it is, there fore, re flected dif fer ently in the world’s le gal 
sys tems. And sov er eignty ob vi ously has more value for weak states than it has for 
stronger states and/or na tions: this par ticu lar is sue has to be con sid ered with re-
gard to the In di ans.
From all these writ ings, only two re flec tions on sov er eignty will be con sid-
ered here.
We owe the first re flec tion to Jean Bodin, whose amaz ing state ment on the 
sov er eign’s re spon si bil ity might come close to the In di ans world: ”The sov er eign”, 
Bodin wrote in the six teenth cen tury, ”is bound to limit him self (only) to wards 
God”2. This ap proach sug gests that the ruler was sub mit ted to the high est au thor-
ity, but also sug gests that the ab so lute mean ing of sov er eignty was achieved, if the 
sov er eign’s au thor ity was in har mony with the di vine one.
The sec ond re flec tion be longs to Robert von Mohl, and his defi ni tion cap tures 
one for the In dian world amaz ingly ap pro pri ate as pect. ”The sov er eign’s unique 
char ac ter is tic fea ture”, writes von Mohl, “is his in ca pac ity to limit him self”3. This 
last defi ni tion in cludes the very sense of dig nity and in teg rity In dian com mu ni ties 
have had over time while deal ing with the fed eral gov ern ment in is sues re lated to 
their un der stand ing about sov er eignty. The sov er eign ”can not limit him self”: in 
its ul ti mate, phi loso phi cal un der stand ing, this state ment im plies the con clu sion 
that there can not be two sov er eigns4. The trag edy of the red man origi nates here 
and so does the le gal his tory that re lates to his most pre cious val ues.
1 Bruce ACKERMAN, Social Justice in the Liberal State, Yale University Press, New Haven, 
1980, p. 4.
2 ”Le Prince souverain n’est tenu rendre compte qu’ a Dieu” – See Jean BODIN, Les six livres 
de la Republique, ch. 8, at. 182 (Original publishing 1576, reprinted at Beck, München, 1986). 
3 Robert von MOHL, Staatsrecht, Volksrecht und Politik. Monographien, vol. 2, Tübingen, 
1862, p. 626. 
4 I am aware that this is an absolutism; but I believe that it captures the native American 
understanding about what we call ”sovereignty”. The realities of federalism, which include 
values like ”cultivation of diversity”, are the (both constitutional and factual) constructions Native 
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Le gal his tory shows, that the doc trines cre ated in or der to jus tify the alien-
ation of In dian lands were far away from Ac ker man’s ap proach about le giti macy. 
Mean while fed eral pol icy on In dian is sues has shifted abruptly over time; there-
fore, fed eral In dian law pre sents ”uniquely for mi da ble” ob sta cles to the de vel op-
ment of uni tary doc trine. This is ap pro pri ate for the de ci sions in sov er eignty-re lated 
is sues as well1.
Rules and prin ci ples on In dian sov er eignty is sues have ori gins that go back to 
”pre con tact times”, pre dat ing the United States Dec la ra tion of In de pend ence. But 
al though the Foun ders ar ticu lated the act of sepa ra tion from Great Brit ain’s co lo-
nial em pire in 1776, the Euro pean heri tage is ”un mis taka bly” re flected in the le gal 
sys tem es tab lished in the ”New World”. This heri tage in cludes the le gal sys tem 
gov ern ing the United States’ re la tions with In dian tribes.
Le gal ideas ap plied by Euro pe ans to Ameri can In di ans’ rights have me die val 
and Ren ais sance ori gins. The tribes’ right to own the land has been con se quently 
ques tioned un der all these doc trines.
As such the cru sad ing le gal tra di tion ap pealed not only to le gal, but also to re-
li gious val ues in or der to jus tify the con quest of In dian lands. In this re spect, it has 
been con ven ient for Euro pe ans to in voke the holy fig ure of the Pope in Rome, ”to 
whom God has given charge of the whole hu man race”2. The Ro man Pon tiff’s uni-
ver sal power re quired obe di ence of the Catho lic Church and the right to dis pose 
on the Na tives ”as their high ness may com mand”. In the Re querimiento prom ul-
gated by the Span ish Crown’s law yers in 1513, ”tak ing away your (the In di ans’) 
goods and do ing to you all harm and dam age that we can, as to vas sals who do 
not obey and re fuse to re ceive their lord”3 was not at all ques tioned, nor was it, in 
any way, ques tion able, ei ther from le gal, nor from re li gious and/or moral point of 
view. It none the less cap tured the very es sence of ra cism, since it not only stressed 
real or imagi nary dif fer ences be tween the rac ist and his vic tim, but also as signed 
val ues to these dif fer ences, claim ing that they are fi nal and there fore justi fy ing 
any pos si ble ag gres sion or privi lege. One can see why the term ”Black Leg end” 
has been used to de scribe Spain’s rapid colo ni za tion and de struc tion of the in dige-
nous cul tures and peo ples in the New World4.
Americans have to deal and accommodate with today.  I believe that their original understanding 
on the ultimate decision-making power comes closer to the exclusive statement announced. The 
realities of today’s federalism are just another outcome of the assimilation process Indians face, 
and another stage of this process. This is shown by the legal language in several Indian cases, 
specifically references to the Indians’ ”abstract” understanding of sovereignty – a reality ”too 
mysterious to decipher”.
1 The confrontation is complicated because of the different times involved. But one cannot 
successfully argue that these are ”sophisms” of ”our time” and that therefore they can hardly be 
applied to vanished times. The debate over values and the Indian world has been going on since the 
time and the works of scholars like Franciscus de Vitoria and Bartolome de Las Casas. Along with 
Justice Marshall and other Supreme Court Justices, they are witnesses of those vanished times. 
2 It took centuries before humanity would start looking critically at this main fiction. And 
we are still struggling today with the implications of this concept. 
3 Reprinted in Charles GIBSON (ed.), The Spanish Tradition in America, University of Carolina 
Press, Columbia, 1968, pp. 58-60. 
4 The last decades’ terror in Guatemala seems to acknowledge that its intention is ”to 
complete at least the destruction of Mayan identity begun by the conquistadores”. For an insight 
into the ”rebirth of the Black Legend” in Guatemala, see Thomas BERGER, A Long and Terrible 
Shadow...cit., 1991, pp. 111-125.
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In con trast to this the ory the writ ings of Fran cis cus de Vi to ria came to ex plore 
the hu man ist idea of a natu ral law con nec tion among all na tions. Con cen trat ing 
on the uni ver sal val ues of man kind – as they were ex pressed be fore and dur ing 
his own life time (he was quot ing the Bi ble, but also the works of Tho mas d’Aquino) 
– Fran cis cus ar gued that ”the In di ans of the Ameri cas”, also free ac cord ing to natu-
ral law, were none the less sub ject to the bind ing norms of the Law of Na tions1.
But, as Fou cault writes, ”power is war”, and power was ”war con tin ued by 
other means” for the Na tives. The Eng lish North Ameri can co lo nial era would in-
flu ence the United States fed eral In dian law and pol icy to the same de struc tive ex-
tent as the Span ish le gal tra di tion did. This time, al though the writ ings of ju rists 
such as Gen tili and Coke de nied in the ory the rights of ”sav age” In dian tribes to 
the ter ri to ries they oc cu pied, in prac tice the colo nies of ten ob tained the con sent of 
the tribes through trea ties and pur chases in or der to set tle In dian-claimed lands2.
This mo ment in his tory opens the era of treaty-mak ing. The tribes were nu-
mer ous and pow er ful at that time, and sign ing a treaty might have been re garded 
as the most suc cess ful ways to wards white set tle ment. There were in stances where 
con sent to vol un tary pur chases could not be freely ob tained from the In di ans and 
co lo nial of fi cials re verted to fraud or out right con fis ca tion in ac quir ing lands they 
de sired, but it stays clear that this new re al ity in volved the fol low ing as sump tions: 
that both par ties were “sov er eign pow ers”, that In dian tribes had ”some” form of 
trans fer able ti tle to the land and that the ac qui si tion of In dian lands was a gov ern-
men tal mat ter, not to be left to in di vid ual colo nists. Re gard less to these con sid era-
tions of a Pub lic In ter na tional Law na ture, the trea ties were ex is ten tially vi tal to 
In di ans, who viewed them as ”sol emn guar an tees”. Given the fact that the oral tra-
di tion was al most an ex clu sive pos ses sion of the “tra di tional” peo ple, they knew 
con sid era bly more about the trea ties than did other In di ans. It is touch ing to read 
that these peo ple “re mem bered the slight est nu ance of mean ing in every treaty 
prom ise”, and they re fer to it ”as if the treaty was signed yes ter day”3. For them, trea-
ties were so sa cred that they re quired ”no more” than the in teg rity of each party for 
en force ment. It is also evi dent that there is lit tle men tion of the com plex of ideas 
that con sti tutes na tion hood in the treaty ne go tia tions, al though an im por tant 
status was be ing changed by the agree ment that peo ple were mak ing. And the In-
di ans’ com pre hen sion of the full sig nifi cance of the trea ties is doubt ful4.
This con tra dic tion con tin ued and ag gra vated af ter the United States suc cess-
fully claimed to in herit Great Brit ain’s right to buy the lands of the In di ans. The 
1 As later explained by Felix Cohen, the greatest federal Indian law scholar, Franciscus de 
Vitoria has provided a ”humane and rational basis for an American Law of Indian affairs”. See 
Felix COHEN, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, Washington, D.C., 
1942. He nonetheless wrote about ”legitimate European power“ over the Indians as a result of 
conquest in a ”just” war or as a result of voluntary cession and agreement by the Indians. In this 
respect, see Franciscus de VITORIA, De Indis et de Iure Belli Reflectiones, E. Nys ed., J. Bate trans., 
Carnegie Institute, Washington, D.C., 1917.
2 Also see Chester E. EISINGER, The Puritan’s Justification for Taking the Land, Essex 
Institute Historical Collections, vol. 84, 1948, pp. 135-143/p. 131. 
3 Vine DELORIA Jr., Clifford M. LYTLE, The Nations Within...cit., p. 234.
4 In Worcester v. Georgia, Justice Marshall admits that ”when, in fact, they (the Indians) 
were ceding lands to the United states […] it may very well be supposed that they might 
not have understood the term employed, as indicating that, instead of granting, they were 
receiving lands”. 
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. IX • no. 4 • 2009
720 MONICA VLAD
Dis cov ery doc trine, ”modi fied to fit the in ter nal, do mes tic law of the United States, 
has been the pri mar ily con cep tual fo cus for all sub se quent fed eral In dian law”1.
Sov er eignty is sues are di rectly or in di rectly con sid ered in al most all of the 
Ameri can In dian Cases. Ex ten sive con sid era tion in this sec tion will be given only 
to the ”Mar shal Tril ogy”, for these early cases ar ticu late fun da men tal le gal prin ci-
ples, that have been de vel oped later by the Ameri can ju ris pru dence with re gard 
to ”the In di ans” and ”the In dian tribes”2.
In the text books deal ing with the roots of fed eral In dian law, the “Mar shall Tril-
ogy” is found un der the head ing ”The Re sponse of Ameri can Law to Cul tural Con-
tact with the Ameri can In dian”. This is really the case, since the rules cre ated in these 
cases be came cru cial for the “In dian-non-In dian” in ter ac tion in the broad est sense.
In the first case, in which the ”opin ion of the court” was ”de liv ered by Chief 
Jus tice Mar shall”, ”John son v. McIntosh” – de cided in 1823 – le gal justi fi ca tion was 
given to the doc trine of dis cov ery. Phrased in ”ma jes tic lan guage” which con cen-
trates im por tant in for ma tion, a fun da men tal prin ci ple emerges from this case. Mar-
shall vali dates over fifty years of ”pre-in de pend ence” be hav ior, spe cifi cally re lated 
to trans ac tions over In dian lands, by de clar ing that ”the su pe rior gen ius of Europe 
might claim an as cen dancy”, that ”dis cov ery gave ti tle to the gov ern ment by whose 
sub jects, or by whose au thor ity it was made, against all other Euro pean gov ern-
ments […] and right of ac quir ing the soil from the na tives, and es tab lish ing set tle-
ments upon it”3. Mar shall’s view on the ab so lute sense of sov er eignty is con sis tent 
with von Mohl’s phi loso phi cal ap proach, when he fur ther writes that ”the ex is-
tence of this power (the fed eral gov ern ment) must nega tive the ex is tence of any 
right which may con flict with and con trol it”. In other words, there can not be two 
sov er eigns, and, there fore, al though the In di ans were ”ad mit ted to be the right ful 
oc cu pants of the soil, with a le gal as well as just claim to re tain pos ses sion of it, and 
to use it ac cord ing to their own dis cre tion”, their rights to ”com plete sov er eignty, 
as in de pend ent na tions, were nec es sar ily di min ished, and their power to dis pose 
of the soil […] was de nied by the origi nal fun da men tal prin ci ple, that dis cov ery 
gave ex clu sive ti tle to those who made it”4.
Mar shal’s cru cial role in cre at ing the law was proba bly an as pect he was not 
aware of him self at the time this opin ion was writ ten. He none the less wrote about 
the ne ces sity ”to es tab lish a prin ci ple” that would avoid “con flict ing set tle ments”. 
”Com pen sa tion” was given to In di ans in terms of ”civi li za tion and Chris ti an ity”, 
a view which, once more, fa vored the ”ex clu sive right to ex tin guish the In dian ti-
tle of oc cu pancy” as a con se quence of the dis cov ery doc trine. Mar shall’s crea tive 
role leads to the ar ticu la tion of the ”po liti cal ques tion doc trine” with re gard to In-
dian is sues: ”It is not for the courts of this coun try”, he writes, ”to ques tion the va-
lid ity of this ti tle, or to sus tain one which is in com pati ble with it”5.
This case changed the In di ans’status from in de pend ent na tions to de pend ent 
ones. The fact that they were ”dif fer ent” was de scribed by Mar shall as the very 
1 Vine DELORIA Jr., Clifford M. LYTLE, The Nations Within...cit., p. 2. 
2 Answers to ”who is an Indian” and ”what is an Indian tribe” are of crucial importance for 
Indian identity. They will be considered later in this study.
3 R. CLINTON, N. NEWTON, M. PRICE, American Indian Law, Charlottesville, Virginia, 
1975, p. 3.
4 Ibidem, p. 3. 
5 Ibidem, p. 4.
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reason why they were ”un gov ern able”. The In di ans were ”fierce sav ages, whose 
oc cu pa tion was war, and whose sub sis tence was drawn chiefly from the for est”.
The lan guage in this case is not at all far from the one used in ar ticu lat ing the 
ori gins of to tali tar ian ide olo gies. Ab so lute con cepts, such as ”sav agery” and ”civi-
li za tion” (con sid ered as the an tithe sis of sav agery, nota bene) were use ful, even nec-
es sary in or der to pre tend that dif fer ent hu man be ings were ”in ca pa ble of 
civi li za tion” and, there fore, of ”full hu man ity”. Mythi cal phrases ex plain ing that 
the Euro pe ans had found ”mag nifi cent op por tu nity to pio neer in a sav age wil der-
ness and to bring civi li za tion to it ”are the ra tion ali za tion for the in va sion and con-
quest of un of fend ing peo ples” and they func tion to day ”to smother ret ro ac tive 
moral scru ples that have been dis missed as ir rele vant to ob jec tive his tory”1.
The set tle ment of North Amer ica is an im mense task. But the fact that the 
Euro pe ans’ in ten tions were to ex ploit rather than to set tle or to ”civi lize” can not 
be dis puted. One does not have to go into fur ther de tail; it is enough to men tion 
here the haz ards of vast wil der ness, the lo gis ti cal prob lems of sup ply ing colo nists 
from fara way Europe and/or the strange ness of the flora and fauna, and the hos til-
ity of the na tives. All these ele ments were more than enough to give Mar shall a 
view about the tre men dous im por tance of his ”origi nal prin ci ple”. It is ob vi ous, in 
this case, that the law is the ex pres sion of a re la tion to power. But not only that: law 
has been im por tant ”both as a fac tor in the geno cidal ex ter mi na tion and as a 
weapon in the con tem po rary strug gle for sur vival”. For most of the 19th cen tury, it 
con sti tuted ”both a for mal and in for mal agent of geno cide”2. If one touches the is-
sue of le giti macy as the high est moral un der stand ing about law and jus tice, the 
cruel irony is that Ameri can law wit nesses an un con ceiv able com plic ity be tween 
law and geno cide in the crea tion of its very first le gal con cepts that ap ply to In di-
ans. As de Toc queville ex pressed it, it would be ”im pos si ble to de stroy men with 
more re spect for the law”3.
The two cases that fol low are no ex cep tion to this trend. On the con trary: they 
regu lar ize the proc ess of Euro-Ameri can ap pro pria tion and geno cide4.
In Chero kee Na tion vs. Geor gia, Jus tice Mar shall had to ar gue the idea of fed eral 
sov er eignty over the Chero kee In di ans and to op pose it to the claims for sov er-
eignty made by the state of Geor gia over the same In di ans. Be ing a fed er alist and 
hav ing to deal with the su prem acy of pol icy over the le gal is sues, Mar shall de-
scribes in the same ma jes tic lan guage how the Chero kees were ”gradu ally sink ing 
be neath our (’the whites’) su pe rior pol icy”. The ri val con cepts on sov er eignty he 
had to deal with lead him to ana lyze the com pli cated re la tion ship be tween the fed-
eral gov ern ment and the In dian tribes in more de tail. He men tions the ’nu mer ous 
trea ties” made with the Chero kees, the fact that they were ”rec og nized as a peo ple 
ca pa ble of main tain ing the re la tions of peace and war, of be ing re spon si ble in their 
po liti cal char ac ter for any vio la tion of their en gage ments [...] The acts of our gov-
ern ments plainly rec og nize the Chero kee na tion as a state, and the courts are 
1 Francis JENNINGS, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism and the Cant of Conquest, 
University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1975, pp. 15-16. 
2 Dennis STRICKLAND, ”Genocide-at-Law: A Historical and Contemporary View of the 
Native Experience”, University of Kansas Law Review, no. 34, 1986, p. 713.
3 Quoted in ibidem. 
4 Obviously, there are many different ways of committing ”a crime”. Cultural destruction is 
definitely one of these ways, and it involves questions of moral responsibility that are strongly 
related to collective memory, but also to the perception about ”the other”.
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bound by those acts”1. But al though Mar shall was ready to ad mit all these facts, 
he none the less stated that ”a ques tion of much more dif fi culty re mains”, and that 
was whether the Chero kees con sti tute a for eign state in the sense of the Con sti tu-
tion. And he con cludes that ”these tribes which re side within the ac knowl edged 
bounda ries of the United States” can hardly be called ”for eign na tions” with strict 
ac cu racy. Fun da men tal con cepts are found here: Mar shall calls the In di ans 
(thereby ex tend ing the situa tion of the Chero kees to all In dian tribes) do mes tic de-
pend ent na tions, who are in a state of pu pil age.
While re fer ring to the con sti tu tional clause which regu lates ”com merce with 
for eign na tions, and among the sev eral states and with the In dian tribes”, Mar-
shall’s ar gu ment is that the le gal lan guage ”con tra-dis tin guishes the In di ans 
from for eign na tions”. From the In di ans’ point of view – who have al ways re garded 
them selves as for eign na tions, in vested with in her ent sov er eignty – this must have 
been un ac cept able. But there is lit tle feed-back on that in this case, as in many oth ers. 
How ever, one should add that, from the In di ans’ point of view, Mar shall’s as ser tion 
on the dis tinct ive ness of the In di ans (”they are des ig nated by a dis tinct ap pel la tion; 
and this ap pel la tion can be ap plied to nei ther of the oth ers, nei ther can the ap pli ca-
tion dis tin guish ing ei ther of the oth ers be, in fair con struc tion, ap plied to them”) 
does not ful fill its prom ise2.
The fa mous words of the Chief Jus tice (”their re la tion to the United States re-
sem bles that of a ward to his guard ian”) are also found in this case. Al though his 
opin ion never uses the term ”fed eral trus tee ship over In dian af fairs”, it con sti tutes 
the ori gin, in the Su preme Court, of this ”im por tant and con tro ver sial” no tion in 
fed eral law. Whether Mar shall con tem plated, in his own life time, that the fed eral 
trus tee ship over In dian af fairs would con sti tute an in de pend ent source of fed eral 
au thor ity over In dian af fairs (as later in voked in cases like United States v. Ka gama 
and Lone Wolf v Hitch cock) is a com plex ques tion. Whether the here im plied trus tee-
ship cre ated en force able le gal re la tion ships, as fur ther de vel oped by the Ameri can 
ju ris pru dence, is equally un clear: the mul ti plic ity of Mar shall’s lan guage gives 
rise to dif fer ent and even con tro ver sial in ter pre ta tions.
A brief in sight into the his tori cal back ground in this case can clar ify some of the 
is sues in volved. The Chero kees are de scribed as ”one of the Five Civi lized Tribes”. 
Their in sti tu tions must have been more com pre hen si ble to Euro-Ameri cans than the 
ones other tribes had. As early as 1802, when Presi dent Jef fer son urged the Chero kee 
to adopt ”a re pub li can form of gov ern ment” their ”re cep tive ness to Euro-Ameri-
can so ci ety, in clud ing in ter mar riage with Scot tish trad ers” al lowed them to ap pear 
as ”the most suc cess ful prod uct” of Jef fer son’s ”civi liz ing” pol icy3. In 1827, the 
Chero kee Na tion cre ated a writ ten tribal Con sti tu tion, pat terned af ter the United 
States Con sti tu tion. Geor gia’s land poli cies came into con flict with Chero kee na-
tional po liti cal de vel op ment and ”pro duced the first great con sti tu tional con flict in 
United States his tory over In dian pol icy”. Since the po liti cal and eco nomic de vel op-
ment of the Chero kee Na tion was ”too much for Geor gia”, state leg is la tion in 1828 
an nexed the lands of the Chero kee Na tion to Geor gia coun ties. This pro vi sion 
made Chero kees ”out laws in their own lands”, and the op pres sive meas ures 
against them were de fined by the state of Geor gia as ”ex er cises of sov er eignty”. It 
1 R. CLINTON, N. NEWTON, M. PRICE, American Indian Law, cit., p. 8.
2 In spite of its masterful multiplicity, in both language and conception.
3 Ibidem, p. 12, n. 58.
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seems that it was in com pre hen si ble both for the state of Geor gia and for the fed-
eral gov ern ment why the Chero kees, in spite of their ”civi li za tion” still wanted to 
be re garded as dif fer ent and why it was im pos si ble to as simi late them into the ”lar-
ger so ci ety”. Per haps for the rea sons ex posed so far, they are of ten de scribed as be-
ing ”the most con tro ver sial tribe”.
Fur ther con cepts with tre men dous im pact on the later prac tice of the Ameri-
can courts, but also on the fed eral pol icy regu lat ing ”In dian af fairs” are found in 
Worces ter v. Geor gia. This time, Mar shall’s lan guage is dif fer ent. He writes that ”his-
tory fur nishes no ex am ple, from the first set tle ment of our coun try, of any at tempt 
on the part of the Crown, to in ter fere with the in ter nal af fairs of the In di ans, fur ther 
than to keep out the agents of for eign pow ers, who […] might se duce them into for-
eign al li ances”. In vok ing the Treaty of Hope well, signed be tween the fed eral gov ern-
ment and the Chero kee Na tions in 1783, he con cludes that the Chero kees ”are un der 
the pro tec tion of the United States of Amer ica and of no other power”. The idea here 
is that the fed eral gov ern ment and fed eral law pro tects tribal sov er eignty and that 
the trea ties with the Brit ish Crown did not im ply ”a right to take the In dian lands” 
ei ther. Mar shall states that fed eral pro tec tion over the In di ans could not in clude the 
”man age ment of all their af fairs”, since this would be ”a per ver sion of the nec es sary 
mean ing” of this ex pres sion. But, in this case, Mar shall’s in ten tion to speak in fa vor 
of In dian sov er eignty is lim ited to a spe cific frame work. While he ad mits that words 
like ”treaty” and ”na tion” are ”words of our (the whites’) own lan guage, se lected in 
our dip lo matic and leg is la tive pro ceed ings, hav ing a defi nite and well un der stood 
mean ing and be ing ap plied to all na tions on earth in the same sense”, and that ”the 
In dian na tions have al ways been con sid ered as dis tinct, in de pend ent com mu ni ties 
[…] from time im me mo rial”, he none the less men tions ”the sin gle ex cep tion im-
posed by ir re sisti ble power”1. And this ex cep tion is the rea son why, ac cord ing to 
Mar shall, the Chero kees (and the In di ans gen er ally) were nec es sar ily de pend ent 
on some for eign po ten tate for the sup ply of their es sen tials wants.
Al though the con se quences of this ex cep tion im plied that ”this re la tion was 
that of a na tion claim ing and re ceiv ing the pro tec tion of one more pow er ful, not 
that of in di vidu als aban don ing their na tional char ac ter”, the an ni hi la tion of the 
Chero kee na tion in its po liti cal ex is tence is ob vi ous and un avoid able. Even if the 
Chero kee na tion oc cu pies its own ter ri tory, with bounda ries ac cu rately de scribed, 
in which “the state of Geor gia can have no force”, their sov er eignty is ”meas ured” 
against Geor gia’s claim and not against the fed eral gov ern ment’s sov er eignty. The 
Chero kees are no longer equal, in the sense of In ter na tional Law, as sov er eign, for-
eign na tions – they are ”do mes tic” and ”de pend ent”. The cru cial is sue in this case 
is that the laws of Geor gia were ren dered in va lid and un con sti tu tional not be cause 
of the ”con tin ued ex is tence” of Chero kee tribal sov er eignty, but due to the fed eral 
law and pol icy pro tect ing (or claim ing to pro tect) tribal sov er eignty. Al though it 
deals with is sues of the ”high est im por tance”, this case can not il lu mi nate a se vere 
moral ques tion and that is: From whom did the In di ans need pro tec tion? Was the 
state ju ris dic tion the only men ace to their iden tity, or did the ”ex cep tion of ir re sisti-
ble power“ in clude the claims to fed eral power (and later, the claims to fed eral ple-
nary power) over In dian is sues…? And what could have been their choice, to their 
own good, in this con text any way…?2
1 Ibidem, pp. 24-25.
2 The severity of this (equally moral and legal) issue is revealed if one considers that cases like 
”Worcester” and ”The Cherokee Nation” won only the legal doctrine battle, but they ultimately 
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None the less, pro pos als for the for ma tion of an In dian state fre quently ap-
peared in the trea ties signed with the fed eral gov ern ment. While ”never ful filled, 
this idea is as old as the na tion”1.
Pos si ble feed-back from the ”In di ans’ world” is vi tal in or der to un der stand 
more about the im pli ca tions of the Mar shall Tril ogy con cepts. There can hardly 
be a more com plex in sight into such con sid era tions than Cohen’s com ments on the 
mean ing of ”ward ship”. First, the Fed eral In dian Law scholar speci fies that terms 
such as ”guardi an ship” and ”trus tee ship”2 have to be un der stood in re la tion with 
Con gress’ in tent to ”de ter mine when and in what man ner” this spe cial re la tion-
ship should ap ply and when it should cease. He also makes it clear that ”this re la-
tion ship does not ex ist be tween the United States and the In di ans, al though there 
are im por tant simi lari ties and sug ges tive par al lels be tween the two re la tion-
ships”. How ever, the ”ward-guard ian” re la tion ship needs to be con sid ered un-
der ”more pre cise topi cal head ings”, as Cohen is, in fact, do ing in his trea tise on 
fed eral In dian law3. One has to be aware that the term ”ward” has been ap plied 
to the In di ans in ”many dif fer ent senses”, and that ”the fail ure to dis tin guish 
among these dif fer ent senses in some in stances may cre ate con fu sion”. Cohen 
also em pha sized that ”in fair ness to the great Chief Jus tice, it must be said that 
hen used the term with more re spect for its ac cepted le gal sig nifi cance than some 
of his suc ces sors have shown”. The term was ap plied to In dian tribes, and not to 
in di vid ual In di ans; more over, what Mar shall said was only that the re la tion to 
the United States of the In dian tribes within its ter ri to rial lim its re sem bles that of 
a ward to his guard ian4.
But in spite of Cohen’s bril liant dis tinc tions in the field of le gal ab strac tion 
(see his nu ance on ”wards as do mes tic de pend ent na tions”, ”wards as in di vidu als 
sub ject to Con gres sional power”, ”wards as bene fi ci ar ies of a trust” or ”wards as 
lost the war of federal policy ”in the halls of Congress and in the White House”. Marshall’s 
rhetoric about the ”legally protected separate sovereign status of the Cherokees could not prevent 
the removal of the Cherokee Nation, nor the Trail of Tears”. 
1 See Article VI of the Treaty with the Delawares (1778) and Article 7 of the Treaty of New Echota. 
The idea that the Indian country ”to the westward” should constitute a Territory ”for the red man 
only” was clearly defined, but never became reality. Natural law was certainly interesting for 
Marshall (as it must have been for some of the early colonists and European lawyers), but he 
nonetheless preferred to rely on positive law in the decision making process. Whether a separate 
Indian state would have been ”compatible with” nineteenth-century American constitutional 
concepts of federalism or with twentieth-century concepts of federalism (as some authors suggest 
as a topic for further study) is certainly a research subject related to the realistic implementation of 
the basic value of federalism: to cultivate diversity. From constitutional point of view, it also 
implies a clear understanding on political harmony between the different states (political entities) 
constituting the federation, for the states’ will to join the federation is essential. 
2 The trustee relationship has been developed tremendously by the American jurisprudence. 
Cases like United States v. Mitchell, decided in 1983 explain the meaning of the federal government’s 
fiduciary responsibility for the management of allotted lands. The responsibility for mismanage-
ment is also considered here. However, to which extent the idea of ”compensation” can replace 
a value that is no longer there remains very questionable, for it is clear that money compensation 
could never replace the crucial importance of the land in Indian culture. The trust relationship has 
always been the source of two opposite views: one emphasizing federal power, the other emphasizing 
federal responsibility. A ”degrading ethnocentrism” supports this theory in both its views. 
3 For further insight, see Felix COHEN, Federal Indian Law, United States Government 
Printing Office, 1958, pp. 558-566.
4 Felix COHEN, Federal Indian Law, cit., p. 559.
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. IX • no. 4 • 2009
Does American Indian Law Reflect Indian Values? 725
non-citi zens”)1 these for the In di ans cru cial dis tinc tions have not been ana lyzed as 
such in the courts’ prac tice of in Con gres sional pol icy over time.
So far it is clear that even a con cept like sov er eignty, which in its fi nal phi loso-
phi cal beauty is ab so lute and which is per ceived as such in the In dian civi li za tion 
– given their sa cred re spect for the cos mic or der and for the es tab lished or der of 
hu man ex is tence – could not be con sid ered out side the tem po ral frame work.
The his tori cal and po liti cal con texts have lim ited the In dian no tion of sa cred, 
in her ited sov er eignty. There fore, a his tori cal per spec tive over fed eral In dian pol-
icy and law is nec es sary.
DISTINCT PERIODS IN FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY
AND THEIR LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
”Quite eas ily done – a para digm of Ameri can pol icy. 
Abo rigi nal ti tle, sol emn trea ties, and the good will of 
presi dents were never enough to pro tect the In di ans.”
Tho mas BERGER
The drama of ”sepa rate cul tures and uni form law” in the spe cific case of Na-
tive Ameri can iden tity re quires deeper in quiry. The sub se quent le gal analy sis is 
there cir cum scribed into this es sen tial frame work.
Fed eral In dian law is ”a sub ject that can not be un der stood if the his tori cal di-
men sion of ex ist ing law is ig nored”2. The in sight into fed eral In dian law nec es sar-
ily has to avoid the law yers’ ”gen eral view on ex ist ing law”, since, should that be 
the case, ”the body of laws thus viewed is a mysti fy ing col lec tion of in con sis ten-
cies and anach ro nisms”. The most enlight en ing syn the sis on this as pect is found 
in At tor ney Gen eral Le gare’s de scrip tion: ”There is noth ing in the whole com pass 
of our laws so anoma lous”, he wrote in 1842, ”so hard to bring within any pre cise 
defi ni tion, or any logi cal and sci en tific ar range ment of prin ci ples, as the re la tion 
in which In di ans stand to wards this gov ern ment and those of the states”3. There-
fore, such com plex di ver sity can be sim pli fied only ”at the risk of ig nor ing facts 
and vio lat ing rights”4, es pe cially if con sid er ing that the le gal cases in volv ing In di-
ans have been noth ing more than an at tempt to clar ify the fed eral gov ern ment-In-
dian tribes re la tion ship.
No one could mas ter the lit era ture cov er ing five hun dred years of White-Na-
tive re la tion ships in two con ti nents in a life time. If the ex per tise is lim ited to the 
Ameri can In di ans in North Amer ica, the his tory of fed eral In dian pol icy can be di-
vided into the fol low ing dis tinct pe ri ods: the co lo nial pe riod (1492-1776), the con-
fed era tion pe riod (1776-1798), the Trade and In ter course Act era (1789-1835), the 
re moval pe riod (1835-1861), the res er va tion pol icy (1861-1887), the Al lot ment pe-
riod and forced as simi la tion (1871-1934), the In dian Re or gani za tion Act pe riod 
1 Ibidem.
2 See Nathan MARGOLD’s introduction to Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, U.S. 
Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor,Washington, D.C., 1942.
3 As quoted by Felix COHEN’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 1958, p. 515.
4 Ibidem.
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(1934-1940), the ter mi na tion era (1940-1962), and the self-de ter mi na tion era 
(1962-pre sent).
Due to the chang ing fed eral pol icy to ward the In di ans, how ever, these pe ri-
ods are of a rather con ven tional na ture, if one ex am ines the of ten con tro ver sial le-
gal de ci sions passed dur ing all this time and their long-term con se quences.
The Co lo nial Pe riod
”The state called ’Amer ica’ is con nected 
only to an in de pend ent set tler col ony. It 
has no place of its own, nor did it ever.”
Jimmie DURHAM
The ex tent of power is al ways set tled within ”geo graphic and sub ject mat ter 
bound ary lines”1. Ex pan sion of a fron tier al ways means ex pan sion of a cer tain ide-
ol ogy and of a spe cific per cep tion about hu man knowl edge. In the case of the Na-
tive Ameri cans and their civi li za tion, the ex pan sion of the Euro-Ameri can fron tier 
(as de scribed by the early set tle ments doc trines and by the later ”mani fest des-
tiny” ide ol ogy) re mains the main cause of iden tity de struc tion.
The co lo nial pe riod was char ac ter ized by wars of con quest and by In dian re-
sis tance, but also by dip lo matic deal ings2.
The Con fed era tion Pe riod
The main ob jec tive of United States’ In dian pol icy dur ing the Revo lu tion was 
to pre serve the neu tral ity of the In dian tribes. The first trea ties be tween the United 
States and the In di ans are an out come of this pol icy. There, they treat the In dian na-
tions as sov er eign en ti ties. Sig nifi cantly, the Treaty with the Dela ware Na tion con-
tem plated the pos si bil ity that the United States “might in vite the Dela ware Na tion 
to form a state and join the Con fed era tion with other tribes al lied to the na tional 
gov ern ment”. The same treaty regu lates an im por tant ju ris dic tional is sue: ”The 
pun ish ment of crimes by citi zens of ei ther party to the preju dice of the other 
would be by judges or ju ries of both par ties, as near as can be to the laws, cus toms 
and us ages of the con tract ing par ties and natu ral jus tice”3.
Re spect for In dian sov er eignty is also found in the lan guage of the Treaty of 
Hope well, signed in 1785. The ”Com mis sion ers’ Pleni po ten ti ary of the United 
1 R. CLINTON, N. NEWTON, M. PRICE, American Indian Law, cit., p. 36.
2 See the treaties between New York and the Five Nations Iroquois Confederation, Georgia’s 
treaties with the Creeks and the Carolinas or the proposed Union of colonies under Benjamin 
Franklin and the ”Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to two Centuries of Federal-State 
Conflict over the Management of Indian Affairs”, Boston U.L. Review, vol. 69, 1989, p. 329. For a 
historical perspective on the Iroquois Confederacy, see Thomas BERGER, A Long and Terrible 
Shadow…cit., the chapter on ”Indians as Allies: The Iroquois”, pp. 55-65. The same study mentions 
that the Iroquois were aware of their ”remarkable past”, including the fact that their Confederacy 
inspired the framers of American Constitution.
3 See Article IV of the Treaty with the Delawares.
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States, in Con gress as sem bled”; says the Treaty’s pre am ble, ”give peace to all 
Chero kees”, and Ar ti cle III ac knowl edges ”all the Chero kees to be un der the pro tec-
tion of the United States of Amer ica, and of no other sov er eign power who so ever”1. 
In the logic of Ar ti cle XI we find the mean ing of this pro tec tion, as it was un der-
stood by the Chero kee In di ans: ”That the In di ans may have full con fi dence in the 
jus tice of the United States, re spect ing their in ter ests, they shall have the right to 
send a dep uty of their choice, when ever they think fit, to Con gress”. The same 
treaty regu lates the Chero kees’ ex clu sive crimi nal ju ris dic tion:
”If any citi zen of the United States, or any other per son not be ing an 
In dian, shall at tempt to set tle on any of the lands west ward or south ward of 
the said bound ary which are hereby al lot ted to the In di ans for their hunt ing 
grounds [...] such per son shall for feit the pro tec tion of the United States, and 
the In di ans may pun ish him or not as they please”.
In a simi lar man ner, Ar ti cle XI sates that ”the United States in Con gress as sem-
bled shall have the sole and ex clu sive right of regu lat ing the trade with the In di-
ans, and man ag ing their af fairs in such man ner as they think proper”2.
The val ues in volved here, like ”peace”, ”jus tice”, ”con fi dence” are sup posed to 
be pro tected in good faith by the par ties. It is ob vi ous that the Chero kee In di ans did 
not un der stand the pro tec tion of the United States to in trude into their sov er eignty. 
The men tion of ”trade with the In di ans” in Ar ti cle XI is not a re lin quish ment of In-
dian sov er eignty, but a regu la tion that con cerns free trade be tween two na tions.
The ”Trade and In ter course Act” Era
The adop tion of the Ameri can Con sti tu tion ”ush ered in a new era in the na-
tional man age ment of In dian af fairs”3. Es pe cially rele vant to the treat ment of In di-
ans are the con sti tu tional Com merce clause and the ex clu sion of ”In di ans non 
taxed” from the enu mera tion of state citi zens for pur poses of con gres sional ap-
point ment, ”thereby sug gest ing that they were no part of the pol ity”4. In di ans are 
viewed here as in di vidu als: the phrase testi fies to the idea that In di ans, as in di-
vidu als, ”could not be as simi lated into the body poli tic”. Also, ”in the world of An-
glo-Saxon prop erty own ers this meant pay ing taxes”. The In di ans were still 
out side the reach of Ameri can sov er eignty and its tax ing power5.
But other trends in fed eral In dian pol icy ap peared soon. In his Fed er alist Pa-
pers, Madi son men tions that it is in com pre hen si ble how a ”trade with In di ans, 
though not mem bers of a State, yet re sid ing within its leg is la tive ju ris dic tion, can 
be regu lated by an ex ter nal au thor ity, with out so far in trud ing on the in ter nal right 
of leg is la tion”6. The first leg is la tive ef fort made by Con gress in or der to as sert the 
1 A stipulation found in Indian treaties generally.
2 See Treaty of Hopewell, Nov. 28, 1785.
3 R. CLINTON, N. NEWTON, M. PRICE, American Indian Law, cit., p. 142.
4 Ibidem, p. 142.
5 Vine DELORIA Jr., Clifford M. LYTLE, The Nations Within...cit., p. 3. Taxes must have been 
perceived as a nonsense by the Indian communities, and – from their perspective – for very good 
reasons, since they had no utilitarian concept on property.
6 See James MADISON, The Federalist, no. 42, 1788. 
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na tional gov ern ment’s ex clu sive con trol over In dian af fairs was the en act ing of 
the Trade and In ter course Act in 1790. The ef forts to place the ex clu sive man age ment 
of trade, dip lo matic re la tions, and land ces sions in volv ing the In di ans in the hands 
of fed eral gov ern ment was re sisted by the states, a fact that of ten led to con sti tu-
tional ten sion. Per ma nent Trade and In ter course Acts fol lowed in later years; how-
ever, sig nifi cant for this time are the ef forts made in the trea ties in or der to es tab lish 
clear lines of de mar ca tion sepa rat ing ”pro tected In dian coun try en claves from 
other lands claimed by the state”1.
The Re moval Pe riod
Un til the War of 1812, the fed eral gov ern ment did lit tle to fur ther the re moval 
of the In di ans, given the fact that In dian tribes, es pe cially those on the west ern fron-
tiers, ”held an im por tant bal ance of power on the North Ameri can con ti nent”2. It 
was es sen tial to pre vent any al li ance be tween the In di ans and the Eng lish; but the 
out come of the war ended this threat, set ting the stage for In dian re moval.
The gov ern ments of the states be came ”in creas ingly dis sat is fied” with the con-
tin ued ex is tence of In dian tribal ”en claves” within their bounda ries. The ero sion of 
tribal sov er eignty there fore led to an in vented re la tion ship be tween the origi nal sov-
er eign be fore dis cov ery (the In di ans) and the suc ces sors of the Euro pean set tlers’ 
struc tures of power (the fed eral gov ern ment). As seen in Chero kee Na tion v. Geor gia 
and in Worces ter v. Geor gia, Geor gia’s leg is la tion set the scene for the re moval of the 
In dian tribes. Simi lar stat utes were passed for the Creeks and Choc taws in Ala bama 
and for the Chero kees in Ten nes see. In spite of their ef forts to re sist the state stat utes 
through fed eral court liti ga tion, the Chero kees – like most of the other tribes in the 
south east ern states – were re moved from the states and – re set tled” on the west side 
of the Mis sis sippi River in the In dian Ter ri tory, now east ern Okla homa.
Com ing back to the re flec tions over the fron tier ex pan sion, one has to keep in 
mind that, un til at least 1861 a cen tral theme in fed eral In dian pol icy was the re-
moval of the tribes be yond state bound ary lines, of ten as a prel ude to the ad mis-
sion of new states into the Un ion.
The Res er va tion Pol icy
Ef forts to re move the In dian tribes from the states was doomed once west-
ward set tle ment ”leap-frogged the In dian Ter ri tory to Cali for nia”3. The crea tion of 
”smaller res er va tions” started as an ”ex peri ment” done by fed eral agents. Trea ties 
were ne go ti ated be tween Cali for nia tribes and the fed eral gov ern ment in the early 
1850’s, but the Sen ate re fused to rat ify them, be cause they de parted from the ”de-
clared re moval pol icy of clear ing resi dent Na tive Ameri can tribes from the states”4. 
1 See, generally, Felix COHEN, Federal Indian Law, cit. 
2 R. CLINTON, N. NEWTON, M. PRICE, American Indian Law, cit., p. 144.
3 Ibidem, p. 146.
4 Ibidem. 
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. IX • no. 4 • 2009
Does American Indian Law Reflect Indian Values? 729
The first con gres sional rec og ni tion that ”such res er va tions” were in tended as ”per-
ma nent ju ris dic tional en claves within the states” is found in the Ena bling Act for the 
Kan sas Ter ri tory. This act au thor ized the for ma tion of the state of Kan sas. It sated 
that the es tab lish ment of the state ”would not be con strued to ex tend state ju ris dic-
tion over In di ans of the Kan sas ter ri tory or to im pair the rights of In di ans of their 
prop erty in the ter ri tory”1. Since such dis claimer of ju ris dic tion es tab lished a pat-
tern, the ena bling acts and con sti tu tions of many states ad mit ted to the Un ion af-
ter 1861 con tained simi lar pro vi sions.
But this is just the le gal side of the res er va tion pol icy. The be gin nings of the 
res er va tion sys tem have to be un der stood in their real di men sion: the mili tary one. 
Fed eral mili tary ”ef forts” were done in or der to force In dian tribes into res er va-
tions or forci bly keep them there. Most of the In dian wars of the last half of the cen-
tury were caused by the ”res er va tion pol icy”. They cul mi nated in 1876 and 1877 in 
two fa mous en coun ters be tween the Army and the Sioux, and be tween the Army 
and the Nez Perce In di ans. It has been said that these wars ”are etched” in the 
Ameri can imagi na tion, since, for them, the ”golden-haired Gen eral Clus ter is the 
most evoca tive sym bol of the In dian wars”2. Ac cord ing to Ber ger, the events lead ing 
to the Lit tle Big Horn are ”a meta phor for the be trayal of prom ises that led to the In-
dian wars”3. The sur ren der of the leader of the Nez Perce In di ans of Wal lowa, Chief 
Jo seph, in 1877 was ”not” ”a he roic mo ment for the United States army”, and so 
were many oth ers in fed eral In dian pol icy. But this par ticu lar mo ment has to be 
men tioned here be cause it put an end to the wars against the In di ans. When Chief 
Jo seph handed over his ri fle to the Army, he spoke the words that have be come 
”the req uiem for the In di ans of the plains”:
”I am tired of fight ing [...] The old men are all dead. Hear me, my chiefs, 
I am tired, my heart is sick and sad. From where the sun now stands, I will 
fight no more for ever”4.
The dig nity in these words should make eve ry one to keep si lent. One has to 
keep in mind that, for the In di ans, the res er va tion sys tem was noth ing else than an 
al ter na tive to ex tinc tion5. The af ter math of Chief Jo seph’s sur ren der was as tragic 
as the de feat of the Nez Perce In di ans it self: the prom ise that the Nez Perce would 
be al lowed to re turn to Idaho, to live there on a res er va tion, was not kept. Not 
even on a res er va tion. They were sent to Okla homa, far from their an ces tral lands, 
where they have, ”ever since”, mourned their lost free dom6.
The res er va tion was not only a means of ”keep ing non-In dian set tlers off In-
dian lands”, but merely to keep the In di ans forci bly fenced within geo graphic and 
po liti cal lines of de mar ca tion. This as pect is par ticu larly tragic for In di ans, if one 
con sid ers that, to the In di ans, land is in al ien able. They be lieve that land is held in 
com mon by all mem bers of the tribe, ”a po liti cal com mu nity that is per pet ual”. 
1 R. CLINTON, ”Development of Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian lands: The Historical 
Perspective”, Arizona Law Review, 1975, pp. 960-961. 
2 Thomas BERGER, A Long and Terrible Shadow...cit., pp. 88-89.
3 Ibidem. 
4 Ibidem, p. 91. 
5 See Robert TRENNERT Jr., Alternative to Extinction: Federal Policy and the Beginnings of the 
Reservation System, 1846-1851, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1975. 
6 See Thomas BERGER, A Long and Terrible Shadow...cit., p. 82. 
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Since earth it self is a liv ing be ing for the In di ans, set ting fences and forc ing them 
to ”ac com mo date” them selves to this ”new” re al ity was un bear able for them and 
it ex plains the high mor tal ity rate, al co hol ism and pov erty one sees even to day in 
In dian res er va tions.
The over all or gani za tions of res er va tions coun cils ”seem to have oc curred in 
con jec ture with” the es tab lish ment of the courts of In dian of fenses by the Bu reau of 
In dian Af fairs1. This ad min is tra tive de vel op ment was ”trig gered” by the Crow Dog 
case, which up held the pres er va tion of tribal law in ar eas that had been re served by 
the In di ans in a prior treaty. None the less, the lan guage in this case as sumed – with-
out any ba sis what so ever – that the In di ans had no gov ern ment and were in ”des-
per ate need” to learn ele men tary kinds of or gani za tion ”for their own good”. It is 
an il lus tra tion of cul tural ”blind ness”, as Deloria called it.
The case dealt with a mur der of a Sioux In dian by an other In dian in In dian 
coun try. It was claimed that the crime was not ”an of fense un der the laws of the 
United States, and that the dis trict court had no ju ris dic tion to try the pris oner”2. It 
is easy to see that the is sues in volved in this case are not only ju ris dic tion, but also 
im por tant as pects of iden tity and dif fer ence. The lan guage of the court uses, ”they 
[the In di ans] were sub ject to the laws of the United States, but not in the sense of citi-
zens, but as wards sub ject to a guard ian”; law is per ceived as “the im po si tion of an 
ex ter nal and un known code”, which makes ”no al low ance for their in abil ity to un-
der stand it”, and which, be ing ”op posed to the strong est preju dices of their sav age 
na ture”, meas ures, ”the red man’s re venge by the max ims of the white man’s mo ral-
ity”) dem on strates a mul ti plic ity which opens the way for di ver gent in ter pre ta-
tions. On one hand, treat ment of the In di ans is, once again, pa ter nal is tic; but 
none the less the con clu sion on han dling the dif fer ence is ”to se cure these peo ple, 
with whom the United States was con tract ing as a dis tinct po liti cal body”3.
As in many later cases, the at tempt to clar ify the re la tion ship be tween the In-
di ans and the gov ern ment of the United States was not suc cess ful. If one ex plores 
the non-In dian re sponses to Crow Dog, it seems that the fact that one group can ex-
er cise power while an other can not, could be con sid ered to be just a mat ter of ”his-
tori cal ac ci dent”.
Crow Dog led to a Con gres sional re sponse – the pass ing of the Ma jor Crimes 
Act in 1885 – and to an ad min is tra tive re sponse – the crea tion of the courts of In-
dian of fenses. The Ma jor Crimes Act ex tended fed eral court ju ris dic tion over the se-
ri ous crimes of mur der, man slaugh ter, rape, bur glary, lar ceny, as sault with in tent 
to kill, and ar son com mit ted by one In dian against an other In dian. Al though this 
stat ute stated that it was ap pli ca ble to ”all In dian res er va tions”, it did not ap ply to 
the Five Civi lized Tribes. Un der the trea ties of 1866, they were al lowed ”a meas-
ure” of self-gov ern ment, which in cluded a com plete code for law and or der in 
tribal courts with the ap peal to the fed eral dis trict court of Ar kan sas. The tribes re-
tained com plete civil and crimi nal ju ris dic tion un til the act passed in 1898, which 
pro hib ited the en force ment of tribal laws in the spe cial fed eral court hav ing ex clu-
sive ju ris dic tion over the In dian ter ri tory. The same act abol ished the tribal courts4. 
Al though ”noth ing in the lan guage of the act com pels the con clu sion that the tribe 
1 Vine DELORIA Jr., Clifford M. LYTLE, The Nations Within...cit., p. 29.
2 See Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883)
3 Ibidem.
4 US. Statutes at Large, p. 30, 495. 
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lost con cur rent ju ris dic tion over these ma jor of fenses”1, treat ment of the In dian 
courts con firmed the pol icy that they should not have ”too much” power. The 
drama of In dian iso la tion in a for eign world in cludes the In di ans’ dif fi culty in me-
di at ing be tween the cus toms and tra di tions that their peo ple cher ished (fol low ing 
the re moval from the South to Okla homa, the tribes adopted con sti tu tions and 
laws that in cor po rated tra di tional po liti cal forms) and the need to pre sent to the 
lar ger so ci ety a form of po liti cal or gani za tion that ”seemed clear, rea son able and 
within the es tab lished po liti cal tra di tion of the lar ger so ci ety”2.
While ex am in ing the as simi la tive goals of the res er va tion pol icy, it is im por-
tant to note that, from the fed eral gov ern ment’s point of view, “the res er va tions 
pro vided a class room for In dian wards”. The dev as tat ing role of ide ol ogy is clear 
if one re flects about the im pli ca tions of the fol low ing state ment: ”Should rules 
that are de signed to edu cate be dif fer ent from rules that are de signed to dis ci-
pline?”… If the ba sis for the res er va tion con cept was its edu ca tional func tion, and 
not a no tion of en ti tle ment to land and right to a cul ture (and there is clear evi-
dence in this sense), then In dian sov er eignty was to suf fer ter ri ble limi ta tions. For 
there is noth ing more de struc tive than in doc tri na tion, in the name of pro gress and 
the In di ans’ ”own good”: The teacher here is the fed eral gov ern ment – and noth-
ing is left of in her ent In dian sov er eignty, if the res er va tion is re garded as a ”way 
sta tion” be tween the so ci ety prior to the ad vent of the Euro pean set tlers and the so-
ci ety when res er va tions would no longer be needed”3. The most ob vi ous lim its are 
the ones placed on the power of the tribe to as sert ju ris dic tion over non-In di ans 
within its mists, at least in crimi nal mat ters. Ju ris dic tion is an es sen tial as pect of 
sov er eignty; and the fed eral pol icy’s in tent to limit it is clear if look ing at later 
cases, like Ol iphant vs. Squam ish In dian Tribe (which was de cided in 1978, and 
where the court con cluded that In dian tribal courts do not have crimi nal ju ris dic-
tion over non-In di ans, a po si tion con firmed in Duro v. Re ina in 1990)4.
The method of in ter pre ta tion used in Ol iphant – in con crete the tre men dous ref-
er ence to le gal his tory that is found in this case – is puz zling, at least from the moral 
point of view5. The case as sumes that In di ans ”nec es sar ily gave up” their power to 
try non-In dian citi zens of the United States, ”ex cept in a man ner ac cept able to Con-
gress”. There is no con sid era tion for In dian sov er eignty in this case, and the de ci-
sion is defi nitely of a sec tar ian na ture. If one looks at the prob lem from a dif fer ent 
per spec tive, one has to con clude that it was be cause of the over rid ing sov er eignty of 
the United States that In dian res er va tions had not nec es sar ily be seen as a part of the 
1 R. CLINTON, N. NEWTON, M. PRICE, American Indian Law, cit., pp. 35-36. 
2 Vine DELORIA Jr., Clifford M. LYTLE, The Nations Within...cit., p. 25.
3 A retrospective analysis on federal Indian policy might, indeed, confirm that the 
termination of Indian tribes started with the conviction that Indians in the reservations 
”graduated”. The expression used here has the sense to illustrate paternalistic attitude of the 
federal government. As later explained in this study, it brought the federal trust relationship and 
the federal benefits for Indians to an end.
4 Mentioning these cases here is due to the anomalous relationship between the Indian 
tribes and the federal government. This anomaly applies to time as well, since early cases and 
their judicial effects have been dramatically challenged later on. From this point of view, there is 
no chronological order, nor can a chronologic understanding be found in these cases (not to 
mention here the difficulties of interpretation in every case). 
5 It is agreed that one cannot find a ”common” logic in exploring Indian cases, given the 
shifting federal policy towards Indians and the ”immense historical shocks” Indian communities 
had to suffer. 
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ter ri tory of the United States. Clearly an ex pres sion of a re la tion to power, the out-
come in this case is that, while fed eral gov ern ment could set the rules for ”In dian – 
non-In dian” in ter ac tion in crimi nal mat ters, the In di ans could not.
The Al lot ment Pe riod and Forced As simi la tion
Struc tural changes in fed eral In dian pol icy were sig naled in the pe riod from 
1871 to 1887. Mean while, im ple men ta tion of the res er va tion pol icy con tin ued. The 
year 1871 ended for mal treaty mak ing with the In dian tribes. The House of Rep re-
sen ta tives’ dis sat is fac tion with the ”pre emi nent role in In dian af fairs that the 
treaty rati fi ca tion proc ess gave to the Sen ate” de cided to cut off the funds for 
treaty ne go tia tion in 1867. Af ter 1871, agree ments with In dian tribes, al though ne-
go ti ated, were ap proved by statu tory en act ment. The al lot ment pol icy aimed to en-
cour age a sed en tary, ru ral ag ri cul tural life for the In di ans and to trans form them 
into farm ers. The Gen eral Al lot ment Act of 1887 only stated and au thor ized this gen-
eral pol icy, its im ple men ta tion was left to in di vid ual ne go tia tions with the af-
fected tribe and the dis cre tion of the ex ecu tive. Al though al lot ment was not 
im ple mented on all res er va tions, the land base of many tribes was rav aged by this 
pol icy. Sec tion 5 of the Act pro vided that ”sur plus” land (not needed for the fixed 
acre age al lot ment to tribal mem bers) would be ceded to the fed eral gov ern ment 
for com pen sa tion through ne go tia tions with the tribe. Be side new dev as tat ing ef-
fects on In dian cul tural val ues, this pol icy of alien ation opened the ”sur plus” 
lands to non-In dian set tle ment. The ef fect was that In dian res er va tions were 
opened to non-In dian set tle ment for the first time.
The long in ter ac tion be tween In di ans and non-In di ans at this par ticu lar time 
led to cruel con tra dic tions, like the sup port of the al lot ment pro gram by some In-
dian ad vo cates. These right sup port ers thought to pro tect the In di ans: an In dian 
”hold ing a pat ent from the fed eral gov ern ment, re stricted against alien ation, en-
joyed greater se cu rity for his land ten ure than the pro tec tion af forded by tribal pos-
ses sion”1. Once again, this proc ess il lus trates the dif fi cult com mu ni ca tion be tween 
the two sys tems of val ues. Many peo ple within the tribes held te na ciously to their 
old cus toms, and con tin ued to live their lives ac cord ing to an cient ways. Even if 
badly eroded, these cus toms did not dis ap pear. The In di ans’ be lief that land was 
un al ien able was one of these strong iden tity pat terns. But the pre dic tion that a 
change from com mu nal ti tle to in di vid ual ti tle would con cen trate own er ship of In-
dian land in the hands of a few per sons was ig nored. The idea that wel fare and 
hap pi ness re quires that the lands be held in pri vate own er ship and man aged in 
per son by its in di vid ual own ers proved to be ”the most es tab lished prin ci ple in 
the Ameri can mind”2. The main ef fect of this pol icy re sulted in the de struc tion of 
the In di ans’ cul tural life ba sis: tribal iden tity. For the fed eral pol icy, ”pro gress” 
meant the end of the lands held by the In di ans on the res er va tions and the end of 
the gov ern men tal power ex er cised on them3.
1 R. CLINTON, N. NEWTON, M. PRICE, American Indian Law, cit., p. 149.
2 Thomas BERGER, A Long and Terrible Shadow...cit., p. 101.
3 Later statutes authorized the leasing of tribal and allotted lands both for surface occupancy 
and for mineral, oil, and gas development. Restraints on alienation were progressively removed. 
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Com ple men tary poli cies in or der to as simi late the In di ans in volved the for-
ma tion of the Bu reau Pol icy and the Courts of In dian Of fenses. These in sti tu tions 
in volved the em ploy ment of In dian tribal mem bers to serve as po lice of fi cers and 
judges for their res er va tions: an al ter na tive power struc ture to the tra di tional 
forms of tribal gov ern ance. ”New of fenses”, as de fined in the Code of In dian Of-
fenses not only in cluded se ri ous crimi nal be hav ior, but also many tra di tional In-
dian cul tural and re li gious prac tices. The most dra matic con fron ta tion be tween 
In dian val ues and the at tempt to de stroy them was then pro hi bi tion on the Sioux 
In di ans’ Ghost Dance, ”a mes si anic na tive re li gious move ment”, which pro duced 
the mas sa cre at Wounded Knee in 18901.
This era pro duced an other act with im por tant con se quences for the In di ans: 
The In dian Citi zen ship Act, passed in 1924. United States citi zen ship was con ferred 
to ”all non-citi zen In di ans born within the ter ri to rial lim its of the United States”. 
This Act sim pli fied pro vi sions of the Gen eral Al lot ment Act and vari ous for mer stat-
utes and trea ties regu lat ing In dian citi zen ship2. For in stance, early trea ties im plied 
that citi zen ship was in com pati ble with con tin ued par tici pa tion in tribal gov ern-
ment or tribal prop erty free from state ju ris dic tion or con trol. But, as ex plained by 
Cohen, ”to day many peo ple who know that In di ans are citi zens are un aware of 
the le gal con se quences of citi zen ship”. He fur ther men tions the more com mon er-
rors in a brief de scrip tion: if citi zens of the United States, In di ans auto mati cally be-
come citi zens of the state of their resi dence – (and what is then left of the 
in com pati bil ity be tween tribal mem ber ship and citi zen ship?) also, citi zen ship has 
not been held in com pati ble with fed eral pow ers of guardi an ship, nor did it auto-
mati cally con fer In di ans the right to vote3.
How ever, the rules of citi zen ship in the An glo-Saxon le gal tra di tion are to-
tally alien to In dian con cepts on mem ber ship. Within a tribal so ci ety, ”the sim ple 
fact” of be ing born es tab lishes both citi zen ship and, ”as the in di vid ual grows”, a 
”ho mo ge ne ity of pur pose and out look”. Be cause cus toms, rit ual and tra di tions 
are ”part of natu ral life”, there is no need for for mal ar ticu la tion of the rules of In-
dian tribal so ci ety, in clud ing mem ber ship4.
The ”In dian Re or gani za tion Act” Pe riod
It was only in 1928 when a re port was is sued, sum ma riz ing the fail ure of the 
fed eral poli cies fol lowed since the late nine teenth cen tury5.
The ap point ment in 1933 of John Col lier as Com mis sioner of In dian Af fairs 
marked ”the emer gence of a very dif fer ent kind of con scious ness” to wards the In-
dian is sues. Col lier knew and deeply ad mired In dian cul ture. His fas ci na tion is de-
scribed in his book From Every Ze nith, with re gard to the Taos Pueblo’s Red Deer 
1 See generally D. BROWN, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee, Hold, Rinehart & Winston, 
New York, 1970 and A. DEBO, A History of the Indians of the United States, University of Oklahoma 
Press, Oklahoma City, 1974, pp. 290-294. 
2 For a detailed insight, see Felix COHEN, Federal Indian Law, cit., pp. 517-523. 
3 Ibidem, pp. 523-526. 
4 Vine DELORIA Jr., Clifford M. LYTLE, The Nations Within...cit., p. 18.
5 See the Miriam report (entitled ”Problems of Indian Administration”), as mentioned in 
R. CLINTON, N. NEWTON, M. PRICE, American Indian Law, cit., p. 152. 
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Dance. ”What I ob served”, he writes, ” was a power of art – of the life-mak ing-art – 
greater in kind than any thing I had known in my own world be fore”1. It seems that a 
fun da men tal dif fer ence be tween the art of the first peo ples and the art we know to-
day is that while the origi nal peo ple cre ated art, all we do to day is to ”con sume” it2.
Col lier started a real cru sade in or der to re form In dian lands. His main ef forts 
aimed to re build the tribal land base and to make the re main ing In dian lands more 
gov ern able. The main goal was to pre vent In dian lands from be ing bro ken up in 
the fu ture and sold to non-In di ans3. Mean while, The In dian Re or gani za tion Act was 
passed in 1934. Its most im por tant pro vi sions au thor ized the Sec re tary of the In te-
rior to ap prove con sti tu tions and cor po rate char ters for In dian seek ing to or gan ize 
un der its pro vi sions.
Within twelve years af ter the adop tion of the Act, 161 tribal con sti tu tions 
were ap proved un der its pro vi sions. For tribes that voted to ex clude them selves 
from the cov er age of the Act –in clud ing those ex tend ing the trust pe riod on al lot-
ments- its pro vi sions were not ap pli ca ble4.
How ever, Mor ton v. Man cari, a case de cided by the Su preme Court in 1974, 
deals with the long-time im pli ca tions of The In dian Re or gani za tion Act. This case is 
par ticu larly sig nifi cant for the in sight it pro vides into the dif fer ent val ues and per-
spec tives in volved. The In dian Re or gani za tion Act ac corded an em ploy ment pref er-
ence for quali fied In di ans in the Bu reau of In dian Af fairs. The ques tion in this case 
is whether this pref er ence is con trary to the anti-dis crimi na tion pro vi sions of the 
Equal Em ploy ment Op por tu nity Act of 1972 and whether it is a vio la tion of the Due 
Proc ess Clause of the Fifth Amend ment. The lan guage in this case ex plains the rea-
sons why Con gress has en acted ”vari ous pref er ences of the gen eral type here at is-
sue”, in sist ing that the pur pose in this situa tion was to give In di ans a greater 
par tici pa tion in their own self-gov ern ment and to re duce the nega tive ef fect of 
hav ing non-In di ans ad min is ter mat ters that af fect In dian tribal life. The same per-
spec tive is found when the Court re fers to le gal his tory:
”It is in this his tori cal and le gal con text that the con sti tu tional va lid ity of 
the In dian pref er ence is to be de ter mined […] The overly pa ter nal is tic ap proach 
of prior years had proved both ex ploita tive and de struc tive of In dian in ter ests. 
Con gress was united in the be lief that in sti tu tional changes were re quired”5.
The fact that this pref er ence is ”simi lar in kind” to the con sti tu tional re quire-
ment that a United States sena tor, when elected, be ”an in habi tant of that state for 
1 John COLLIER, From Every Zenith, Sage Books, Denver, 1963, p. 126.
2 See Friedrich DÜRRENMATT, Die Schweiz – ein Gefängnis, Diogenes Verlag, Zürich 1990.
3 For a comparison between the Collier Bill and The Indian Reorganization Act see Vine 
DELORIA Jr., Clifford M. LYTLE, The Nations Within...cit., pp. 141-153. It has been said, if the 
Indians would have in fact understood the implications of Collier’s thinking (which included 
restoration of political sovereignty) they might have been ”more violently against him 
themselves”. The essence of Indian destruction, as promoted by the allotment policy, was that 
too many Indians had adjusted to the idea of individual allotments and did not want to constitute 
a formal government that ”might eventually impinge on their use of their own lands”. This a 
more profound level of analysis, and it shows the effects of a long interaction between two 
incompatible systems of values. 
4 Such extensions were, nonetheless, made by subsequent executive power. 
5 See Morton v. Mancari, in R. CLINTON, N. NEWTON, M. PRICE, American Indian Law, cit., 
p. 96.
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which he shall be cho sen” is a state ment that il lu mi nates the Su preme Court’s in-
tent in this case, as well as its un der stand ing of the true na ture of the In dian pref er-
ence. The Court con cludes that the em ploy ment pref er ence is not of a ra cial, but of 
a po liti cal na ture, rea sona bly de signed to fur ther the cause of In dian self-gov ern-
ment and to make the Bu reau of In dian Af fairs more re spon sive to the needs of its 
con stitu ent groups1.
The Ter mi na tion Era
”In di ans were sub jected to the most 
in tense pres sure to be come white. Laws 
passed by Con gress had but one goal: 
The An glo-Saxoni za tion of the In dian.”
Vine DELORIA
The In dian Re or gani za tion Act sur vived many leg is la tive at tacks di rected 
against its ”ex plicit ideo logi cal na ture”. None the less, these at tacks show the de-
gree of tol er ance to wards the au then tic val ues of the In dian world the ”lar ger so ci-
ety” was ca pa ble to ac cept:
”This (The In dian Re or gani za tion Act) at tempts to set up a state or a na-
tion which is con trary to the in tents and pur poses of the Ameri can Re pub lic, 
No doubt that the In di ans should be helped […] but in no way should they 
be set up as a gov ern ing power within the United States of Amer ica […] 
They shall be per mit ted to have a part in their own af fairs as to gov ern ment 
in the same way as any do mes tic or gani za tion ex ists […] but not to be in de-
pend ent or apart there from”2.
Dur ing the ter mi na tion era, Con gress adopted a stat ute, com monly known as 
Pub lic Law 280, which op er ated for af fected res er va tions to trans fer the ju ris dic tion 
over crimes and civil cause of ac tion pre vi ously ex er cised by fed eral and tribal 
courts to state au thori ties. It trans ferred ju ris dic tion to the states over all res er va-
tions in Cali for nia, Min ne sota (ex cept the Red Lake Res er va tion), Ne braska Ore-
gon (ex cept the Warm Spring Res er va tion) and Wis con sin (ex cept the Me nomi nee 
Res er va tion)3. All other states were au thor ized to as sume ”vol un tary com plete or 
par tial ju ris dic tion” over the other In dian res er va tions within the states4.
Over time, the per sis tent ques tion of the Con gress – “In dian tribes” re la tion-
ship has been the de gree of auton omy the In di ans re tained within their ”re served” 
lands. While ”ple nary con gres sional power” over In dian af fairs has been firmly es-
tab lished and re af firmed in the Ameri can ju ris pru dence, the al lo ca tion of power be-
tween the tribes and the states ab sent con gres sional ac tion re mained ”less cer tain”.
1 Ibidem, p. 98.
2 Hearings on S. 2103 before the Committee on Indian Affairs, H. R., 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 
1940.
3 R. CLINTON, N. NEWTON, M. PRICE, American Indian Law, cit., p. 158.
4 Alaska was later added to the list of states affected by mandatory provisions of Public Law 
280, when it was admitted to statehood. For a fascinating insight into the situation of Alaskan 
Natives under Russian and American rule, see Felix COHEN, Federal Indian Law, cit., especially 
the chapter on Alaskan Natives, pp. 927-964.
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This is the field with re gard to which Pub lic Law 280 has so dra mati cally 
changed the men tioned re la tion ship. One could base a cri tique of Pub lic Law 280 
on the ex ten sion of state ju ris dic tion in the ab sence of tribal con sent, but that is not 
the only as pect that has to be speci fied. The main dev as tat ing ef fect for the In di ans 
was the law less ness this law para doxi cal cre ated. For in stance, in the United States 
v. Ka gama case the dis pute be tween the two in volved Klamath In di ans es ca lated 
into homi cide be cause the Bu reau of In dian Af fairs did not re spond to Ka gama’s 
claim, but in turn di rected the re quest to Wash ing ton. It has been ar gued that lack 
of fed eral as sis tance proved fa tal in this case1.
The di rect ef fects of Pub lic Law 280 were the ex ten sion of state crimi nal ju ris-
dic tion and civil ju di cial ju ris dic tion over res er va tion In di ans in cer tain states and 
the elimi na tion of spe cial fed eral crimi nal ju ris dic tion over res er va tion ar eas in the 
states spe cifi cally named in the law. The law sub sti tuted state le gal au thor ity for 
fed eral on all the des ig nated res er va tions. There was no men tion of tribal au thor-
ity what so ever.
As a re sult, tribes in Pub lic Law 280 states are at a dis ad van tage com pared 
with tribes else where in the United States. The suf fer from ”lower lev els of fed eral 
sup port and an ab sence of com pen sat ing state sup port. They are sub jects to abuses 
of power and gaps in le gal au thor ity”2. It is spe cially the case of Cali for nia where 
tribes have been bro ken into such ”small and het ero ge ne ous groups” that form ing 
”ef fec tive jus tice sys tems” is very unlikely at the tribal level.
Most of the tribes who lost their fed eral status did not es cape from the bur-
dens of ward ship. In a fi nal for mu la tion, the ef fects of the ter mi na tion pol icy can 
be sum ma rized as fol lows:
”A ter mi nated tribe may ex ist to an an thro polo gist, but not for the pur-
pose of in ter pret ing a stat ute grant ing statu tory bene fits only to rec og nized 
tribes. Con gress can and has granted some bene fits to mem bers of ter mi-
nated tribes, but only when it has cho sen to de fine the term ’tribe’ as in clud-
ing them”3.
The Self-De ter mi na tion Era
”I once ex plained Ameri can In dian le gal rights and 
the con se quent de mands of the Ameri can In dian Move-
ment to a mem ber of the In sti tute for Pol icy Stud ies.
His re sponse was: ’That would mean the breakup of 
the United States.’ And he was un doubt edly cor rect.”
Jimmy DURHAM
The root con cept for ”in dige nous peo ple” is the Latin in di genae, as op posed to 
ad ve nae, per sons who ar rived from else where. In di ans al ways be lieved they had 
a place on their own, given to them once for ever, a view con sis tent with their 
1 For a detailed analysis of Public Law 280 and its effects, see Carol GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, 
Planting Tail Feathers: Tribal Survival and Public Law 280, California University Press, Los Angeles, 
California, 1997.
2 Ibidem, p. 37.
3 R. CLINTON, N. NEWTON, M. PRICE, American Indian Law, cit., p. 79.
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percep tion about cos mic time. The fun da men tal ques tion to day is: How can the 
me die val con cept of ward ship be rec on ciled with the idea of self-de ter mi na tion of 
in dige nous peo ples?
Let’s first ex am ine the leg is la tive situa tion of this era.
Trends to strengthen tribal sov er eignty started with the Nixon presi dency in 
1970. This idea im plied stronger tribal con trol while ad vo cat ing pro tec tion of the 
In dian land base and re sources. The Nixon mes sage ”set the leg is la tive agenda for 
Con gress in the field of In dian af fairs for the en tire dec ade”1. The pass ing of the In-
dian Self-De ter mi na tion and Edu ca tion As sis tance Act in 1975 was also aimed at 
strength en ing tribal con trol over fed er ally funded pro grams for In di ans.
A se vere is sue of op pres sion has al ways been the place ment of In dian chil dren 
into a white en vi ron ment ”for their own good”. In this re spect, the In dian Child Wel-
fare Act of 1978 was de signed to re duce the ex er cise of state ju ris dic tion in child cus-
tody or adop tion pro ceed ings in volv ing In dian chil dren who were tribal mem bers 
or eli gi ble for mem ber ship in a tribe. It pro vided rig or ous stan dards re quir ing state 
au thori ties to at tempt ”to place an In dian child need ing place ment in the home of 
an ex tended fam ily mem ber, the home of a tribal mem ber, a tribal group home or 
an In dian home” be fore the child could be placed with a non-In dian fam ily2.
The In dian Land Con soli da tion Act of 1982 sought to rem edy some of the ves tig-
ial ef fects of al lot ment by au thor iz ing tribes to es tab lish plans for land con soli da-
tion on heav ily al lot ted res er va tions.
The con cern about the fu ture of Na tive Ameri can val ues is strongly linked to 
the dy nam ics of Pub lic In ter na tional Law with re gard to in dige nous peo ples. The 
In dian way of life has not merely sur vived; it is back ”at the foun da tion of a 
strong iden tity which has forced it self into the top of the in ter na tional agenda”3. 
The val ues of In dian cul ture are ”sought–af ter mod els for a world drift ing slowly 
into alien ation”4.
It is easy to con clude from the ex posed con sid era tions on the leg acy of con-
quest that the United States of Amer ica are built ”on the rock of a fiercely mor al is-
tic myth, the right to self-de ter mi na tion and the right to se cede from a sov er eign 
who vio lates the rights of the peo ple who con sider them selves a com mu nity”5. 
The Dec la ra tion of In de pend ence is the ”tex tual ex pres sion of that pri mor dial feel-
ing”6. To which ex tent this idea is only a myth can be meas ured against the as pi ra-
tions for free dom the abo rigi nal peo ples of the Ameri cas had and have. For their 
pri mor dial feel ing has to be con sid ered in the era of self-de ter mi na tion. From this 
point of view, the strength of tribal re sis tance has shown that tribal gov ern ment’s 
au thor ity pre dates and sur vives the United States’ con sti tu tional sys tem. This ba-
sic and sim ple re al ity has the fol low ing con se quence: in dige nous popu la tions have 
al ways per ceived them selves as liv ing within the era of ”self-de ter mi na tion”. This 
con cept can not be lo cal ized in time, and it is fic ti tious to the ex tent to which it has 
been im posed on the Na tive Ameri can world by its colo niz ers. It pri mar ily means 
1 See ibidem, p. 160.
2 Ibidem, p. 161
3 See Siegfried WIESSNER, ”Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples. A Global Comparative 
and International Legal Analysis”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, no. 12, 1999, pp. 57-128/p. 59.
4 Ibidem; this amazing statement refers to the sacred view about the environment that is 
found in Indian culture. 
5 Siegfried WIESSNER, ”Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples...cit.”, p. 63.
6 Ibidem, p. 6.
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. IX • no. 4 • 2009
738 MONICA VLAD
a time less un der stand ing of self-de fined dig nity, which might well be come a con-
crete re al ity to day.
The Gam ing Regu la tory Act of 1988 cre ated the In dian Gam ing Com mis sion to 
regu late the emerg ing In dian gam ing op era tions that be came a sub stan tial source 
of tribal reve nues. To day, these reve nues help change the dev as tat ing ef fects of 
pov erty and il lit er acy on the res er va tions. More than fifty tribes op er ate more than 
100 bingo halls and ca si nos within the ter ri to rial con fines of nine teen states, tak ing 
six bil lion dol lars a year1. None the less, in 1997, of the 554 fed er ally rec og nized 
tribes, 306 are de fined as ”small and needy”, with out suf fi cient funds to op er ate 
with out fur ther fed eral sup port.
In dian hous ing be came a pri or ity of the De part ment of Hous ing and Ur ban 
De vel op ment. Still, when Presi dent Clin ton de fines the ”fed eral gov ern ment-In-
dian tribes” re la tion ship as a ”gov ern ment to gov ern ment” re la tion ship, one has 
to re mem ber Deloria’s state ment:
”Given the fact that tribal gov ern ments are closely con trolled by the 
fed eral gov ern ment and ob tain a good deal of their ad min is tra tive over head 
from the fed eral gov ern ment, this phrase has less sub stance than peo ple 
would like to ad mit”2.
There is a long way to go in or der to achieve the val ues of self-de ter mi na tion3. 
But, in the In dian world, a strong mo ti va tion to achieve them is con stantly there. 
The cry for self-de ter mi na tion of the Na tive Ameri can to day has to be seen within 
”the re sur gence of in dige nous com mu ni ties world wide, and a thor ough analy sis 
of the roots of the le gal re la tion ship be tween the In dian tribes and the coun try in 
which they re side”, for this will re store the ”com plex mix of in ter na tional and do-
mes tic pre scrip tions ap pli ca ble to the unique story of at tempted con quest and sur-
vival that con sti tutes the In dian ex peri ence”4.
All im por tant change, which turned around the poli cies of ter mi na tion, oc-
curred due to the Nixon era. From a con ven tional point of view, this might the be-
gin ning of the self-de ter mi na tion era. But some of the leg is la tion of this time 
af fected only par ticu lar tribes. For ex am ple, the Me nomi nee Tribe of Min ne sota, 
the Silez Tribe of Ore gon, the Wy an dotte, Peo ria, Ot tawa and Mo doc Tribes of 
Okla homa, and oth ers were re stored to fed eral rec og ni tion and su per vi sion in 
1973, 1977, and 1978, re spec tively, af ter hav ing been ter mi nated by leg is la tion in 
1 Although we witness this success, other aspects have to be considered as well. An article 
published by The New York Times shows that Indians are crime victims at a rate above US average: 
while the average for whites was 49 crimes per 1000 people, for blacks 61 and for Asians 29, the 
average annual rate at which Indians were victims of crimes was 124 crimes per 1000 people. 
These statistics show that there that there still is a lot of prejudice against Indians, especially on 
the edge of reservations. A study released by the Department of Justice also found that Indians, 
unlike whites and blacks, were most likely to be the victims of violent crimes committed by 
members of a race other than their own. See The New York Times, February 15, 1999.
2 Vine DELORIA Jr., Clifford M. LYTLE, The Nations Within...cit., p. 262.
3 With the exception of the Nunavut Nation in Canada, for instance, which established its 
own territory in April 1999, and the Eskimo people in Greenland.
4 Siegfried WIESSNER, ”Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples...cit.”, p. 102. Also see 
Ch. WILKINSON, J. VOLKSMAN, ”Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: ’As long as Water 
Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth’ – How Long a Time Is That?”, California Law Review, no. 63, 
1975, p. 601.
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the 1950’s1. In ad di tion, new fed eral leg is la tion strength ened an re or gan ized a fed-
eral re volv ing loan fund for In dian and pro vided fed eral loan guar an tees for pri-
vate sec tor loans to sup port such de vel op ment. Af ter 1977, the po liti cal mo men tum 
for a fun da men tal change in the di rec tion of fed eral In dian pol icy be came in tense. 
Or gan ized po liti cal groups, like Mon tan ans Op posed to Dis crimi na tion and the In-
ter state Con gress for Equal Rights and Re spon si bili ties, un suc cess fully lob bied 
Con gress to ex tin guish In dian rights and force In dian as simi la tion2.
The 1980’s marked an im por tant tran si tional pe riod both for fed eral In dian 
pol icy and for tribal self-suf fi ciency. Per sis tent ef forts were made dur ing the 
Reagan ad mini stra tion to re duce the fund ing of ”many fed eral pro grams tar geted 
for In di ans, to merge such spe cial ized fed eral In dian pro grams into more gen eral, 
of ten state ad min is tered, so cial ser vices and bene fits pro grams, or to elimi nate fed-
eral fund ing al to gether”3.
How ever the dy nam ics of fed eral man age ment over In dian af fairs, a spe cific 
and com pli cated is sue is the ar ticu la tion of spe cial needs and/or rights in dige-
nous peo ples have to day. These can not be found in the gen eral pre scrip tions of 
what is known as ”In ter na tional Hu man Rights Law”. This is true for codi fied and 
for cus tom ary law alike. In this con text, the role of the United Na tions has to be re-
ex am ined and re de fined in many re spects. Ef forts in this sense be come com pre-
hen si ble if look ing at the 1993 Draft Dec la ra tion on the Rights of In dige nous Peo ples 
made by the UN Work ing Group on In dige nous Popu la tions. The pro posed Ameri-
can Dec la ra tion on the Rights of In dige nous Peo ples of 1997 con tains an im por tant ele-
ment: it de fines that ”self-iden ti fi ca tion as in dige nous shall be re garded as a 
fun da men tal cri te rion for de ter min ing the peo ples to which the pro vi sions of this 
dec la ra tion ap ply”4.
How ever, the com mu nity of states seems to be united so far in the re jec tion of 
the op tion of full sov er eignty and po liti cal in de pend ence for in dige nous peo ples. 
But the idea of a Per ma nent Fo rum for In dige nous Peo ples as en vi sioned as en vi-
sioned by the United Na tions Work ing Group could per haps lead to their rep re sen-
ta tion as the United Na tions some times in the fu ture.
The fi nal goal of this meta mor pho sis has to be the crea tion of a pub lic or der of 
hu man dig nity5. Its mani fes ta tions are visi ble to day, and we wit ness them in many, 
very para doxi cal forms. The most pow er ful one is the fact that we have suf fi cient 
state prac tice and opinio iuris to speak of a cus tom ary in ter na tional law right to 
land the in dige nous peo ples tra di tion ally pos sessed and have man aged to keep, as 
well as a right to a – how ever for mu lated – auton omy. Every re al is tic ap proach on 
in dige nous peo ples’ rights has to ad dress this core need6. It has fi nally been said 
that the United States doc trine of ple nary power over In dian af fairs, in clud ing the 
1 The federal recognition of the Menominees, for instance, has to be seen within the 
framework provided by the appointment of Ada Deer to head of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
This is, obviously, an aspect of self-determination, a success of self-defined dignity.
2 R. CLINTON, N. NEWTON, M. PRICE, American Indian Law, cit., p. 162.
3 Ibidem.
4 As quoted by Siegfried WIESSNER, ”Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples...cit.”, p. 120 
and the following. For an extensive view on the definition of indigenous peoples, as well as the 
role of international organizations, see the same article.
5 See Siegfried WIESSNER, ”Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples...cit.”.
6 This approach successfully fights the assumption that has been so well addressed by 
William Raymond: ”The indigenous populations must be always and essentially unreal, a 
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power of Con gress to ex tin guish, with out com pen sa tion, In dian ti tle, is vio lat ing 
in ter na tional hu man rights1.
Re vi tali za tion of In dian tribes can be traced back to the 1960ies, when two im-
por tant pieces of In dian leg is la tion were passed. Pub lic Law no. 89-635 passed by 
Con gress au thor ized ”any In dian tribe or land with a gov ern ing body duly rec og-
nized by the Sec re tary of the In te rior” to file suite in fed eral dis trict court with out 
ref er ence to amount in con tro versy ”for cases aris ing un der the Con sti tu tion, law 
and trea ties of the United States”2. Also, the here al ready men tioned In dian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968 re quired all In dian tribes in ex er cis ing their self-gov ern ment 
pow ers to ob serve and pro tect ”most, but not all, of the guar an tees of the Bill of 
Rights, the four teenth amend ment, and ar ti cle 1, sec tion 10 of the Con sti tu tion”3. 
Pub lic Law 280 was amended to re quire tribal con sent for all fu ture state ac qui si-
tions of ju ris dic tion over an In dian res er va tion. The way was opened for state-ini-
ti ated ret ro ces sion to the fed eral gov ern ment of ju ris dic tion pre vi ously ac quired 
by the states un der Pub lic Law 280 and the prepa ra tion of a ”model code” gov ern-
ing courts of In dian of fenses be came pos si ble4.
But be side dis putes over land, which are far from be ing re solved, an other phe-
nome non is go ing on in the era of self-de ter mi na tion. This phe nome non has been 
de scribed by Lau rie Ann Whitt as ”a pat tern that be gan with in dige nous lands 
and re sources and which con tin ues now with in dige nous knowl edge, spiri tual 
and sci en tific, of the natu ral world. The land and re source grab bing has not ended, 
but a new ver sion of cog ni tive search-and sei zure has be gun”5. Ironi cally, the pro-
mo tion of Na tive cul ture to tour ists and vio lence and dis crimi na tion against Na-
tive Ameri cans con tin ues side by side6. These un be liev able ex tremes have been 
clearly stated by Jimmie Dur ham, when he writes that ”In dian suf fer ing is part of 
en ter tain ment”, and that ”as our situa tion wors ened, Amer ica loved us all the 
more”7. The most pain ful mani fes ta tions of this phe nome non are visi ble within 
the prob lems posed by ac cess to in dige nous sa cred knowl edge and sa cred sites 
and by the dese cra tion of Na tive Ameri can graves8. The fact that all this is pos si ble 
to day rises very se ri ous ques tions: Are there any moral lim its to ar cheo logi cal 
figment of the national imagination. No more or less”. See Raymond W. STEDMAN, Shadows of 
the Indian: Stereotypes in American Culture, University of Oklahoma, Norman, 1982.
1 See Erica Irene DAES, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Dis cri-
mination and Protection of Minorities, Chairperson of the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples, 
Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 1997.
2 See R. CLINTON, N. NEWTON, M. PRICE, American Indian Law, cit., pp. 157-158. 
3 Ibidem, p. 158.
4 Ibidem.
5 See Laurie Ann WHITT, ”Resisting the Politics of Disappearance”, in Michael GREEN (ed.), 
Issues in Native American Culture Identity, cit., p. 251.
6 Aspects of grotesque commercialization can be found in different tourist guides. I will 
limit my examples here to FODOR’s Affordable Florida Guide from 1993, where the Miccosukee 
restaurant is described as an ”Everglades tourist attraction”. There, one can find ”murals with 
Indian themes”, as well as ”Indian burgers and Indian tacos”.
7 See Jimmie DURHAM, ”Cowboys and …cit.”, p. 435.
8 It is difficult to write this down, but one really has to address the issues the way they are. 
A Pawnee burial area near Salina, Kansas, was excavated in the 1930s and the skeletons were 
displayed as a local tourist attraction until 1989, when Pawnee leaders succeeded in having the 
graves closed. For more information on this issue, extensively see Erica Irene DAES, Protection of 
the Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, cit., p. 7.
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inquiry? Na tional le gal sys tems treat any thing found in the soil be long ing ei ther 
to the gov ern ment, or to the owner of the land. How are we to look at this as pect 
of le gal ity, and what le giti macy does it have…? In es sence, ”what other ra cial 
group in this coun try has been forced to en dure the sac ri lege of watch ing the re-
mains of rela tives ripped from their bur ial sites and dis played to sat isfy a to tally 
un fa thom able and mor bid sense of sci en tific cu ri os ity…?”1.
It is in es cap able to see the dif fer ence be tween true sci ence and these out ra-
geous prac tices. In dige nous peo ples have said it them selves in a very clear man-
ner: all prod ucts of the hu man mind and heart are in ter re lated, and they flow from 
the same source: the re la tion ships be tween the peo ple and their land, their kin ship 
with the other liv ing crea tures that share the land, and with the spirit world2.
But the trag edy of colo ni za tion and alien ation has led to one cer tain re sult: in-
dige nous peo ples have been de prived not only of their most pre cious val ues, but 
of their his tori cal age it self. There fore, when ever we try to un der stand the root of 
the con flict, we have to re mem ber that ”the pro found di vi sion in the Ameri cas is 
not be tween North and South, but be tween In di ans and set tlers”3.
SPECIFIC AMERICAN INDIAN ISSUES
So far, the aim of this pa per has been to pro vide an in sight into the in flu ence 
Ameri can In dian Law has had over In dian iden tity. But its task is also to make un-
der stand able how Ameri can In dian Law – as an out come of fed eral In dian pol icy – 
con trib uted to the ero sion of this iden tity.
Para doxi cally enough, ques tions like ”who is an In dian” and ”what is an In-
dian tribe” might be come more dif fi cult af ter study ing these is sues than they 
have been be fore that. How ever, it has to be speci fied in the first place that gen-
eral defi ni tions on iden tity ques tions do never suf fice, and that the an swers 
have to be sought ”pri mar ily in ap pli ca ble stat utes, de ci sions, opin ions or tribal 
law”4. None the less, if – le gally speak ing – ”an In dian is what the law leg is la-
tively de fines, or ju di cially de ter mines him to be”, the same can not be said if 
one wants a deeper in sight into In dian iden tity. The law frus trates this deeper 
in sight – a fact which might have mo ti vated schol ars to dis tin guish be tween the 
le gal and the eth no logi cal defi ni tion on ”who an In dian is”. The same is true for 
the In dian tribes.
I can not re frain from men tion ing an im por tant nu ance here. It has to do with 
ter mi nol ogy. As Deloria writes, ”the word In dian is to broad and it gen er al izes a 
defi ni tion”5. This is rather an ”eth nic la bel” pinned by whites. Deloria fur ther men-
tions that the ap pel la tion ”a tribal In dian” is cer tainly bet ter than sim ply ”tra di-
tional”. But while the ”tribal In dian” did not want to as so ci ate with peo ple out side 
the tribal com mu nity, unless forced tot do so, Deloria con cludes, the ”eth nic 
1 See Laurie Ann WHITT, ”Resisting the Politics of Disappearance”, cit., p. 7.
2 For an extensive insight into the significance and the value of heritage for indigenous 
peoples, see Erica Irene DAES, Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, cit.
3 See Jimmie DURHAM, ”Cowboys and...cit.”, p. 433. He ironically presents this statement 
as an ”outrageous idea”.
4 Felix COHEN, Federal Indian Law, cit., pp. 4-20.
5 Vine DELORIA Jr., Clifford M. LYTLE, The Nations Within...cit., p. 235.
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Indian” is a per son who, to day, looks be yond the res er va tion to see ”both op por tu-
ni ties and dan gers the tribe might en coun ter”1.
But fur ther de scrip tion will not bring a clari fi ca tion. What is es sen tial to In-
dian iden tity is that emo tional con ti nu ity with their an ces try has to be ”se ri ously 
con sid ered” and rec og nized, if one at tempts to re solve this com pli cates ques tion. 
This per cep tion is re lated to val ues like tribal in her ent sov er eignty, cul tural re-
newal and the fun da men tal In dian In stinct to live ac cord ing to an cient ways2.
In dian le gal status de pends not only upon bio logi cal, but also upon so cial fac-
tors. Eth no logi cally, the In dian race may be dis tin guished from the Cau ca sian, Ne-
gro, Mon go lian and other races. If a per son “is three fourths Cau ca sian and one 
fourth In dian, it is ab surd, from the eth no logi cal stand point, to as sign him to the 
In dian race”, but le gally such a per son may ”still be an In dian”3. When us ing the 
term ”In di ans” leg is la tors deal with a spe cific group dis tin guished from ”non-In-
dian” groups by ”pub lic opin ion”. As Cohen em pha sizes, this
”pub lic opin ion var ies so widely that on some res er va tions it has be come com-
mon to re fer to a per son as an In dian al though 15 or 16 an ces tors back were 
non-In di ans parts of the coun try; while in other parts of the coun try […] a 
per son may be con sid ered a Span ish-Ameri can rather than an In dian al-
though his blood is pre domi nantly In dian”4.
But leav ing aside all these vari ous re ali ties ”on the ground”, and ad mit ting 
that ”some prac ti cal value” may be found in a defi ni tion of an ”In dian”, two cri te-
ria are con sid ered. A per son is an In dian if some of his an ces tors lived in Amer ica 
be fore dis cov ery and if he or she is con sid ered an In dian by the com mu nity in 
which he/she lives5.
As it can (again) be seen here, tribal iden tity is cru cial for the In dian sense of 
be long ing. Still, a per son re garded as a mem ber by the tribe might not be so re-
garded by the Sec re tary of In te rior, who claims the au thor ity to de ter mine mem-
ber ship for pur poses of dis trib ut ing prop erty rights. This is one of the rea sons 
why, within the sphere of fed eral In dian law, a ques tion of In dian iden tity can 
only be an swered with ref er ence to the vary ing pur poses for which ”it is nec es-
sary to an swer the ques tion”. Anoma lies re sulted be cause of the in ter fer ence be-
tween for mal tribal roles and fed eral per cep tions on mem ber ship is sues. ”En rolled 
mem bers” of an In dian tribe to day can in clude per sons who are not ra cially In-
dian or oth ers, who are ra cially In dian, but who do not iden tify them selves as 
”mem bers of the In dian com mu nity”6.
1 Ibidem.
2 These are, subjective concepts, and therefore hard to define.
3 Felix COHEN, Federal Indian Law, cit., p. 5.
4 Generally see ibidem, pp. 4-20. These considerations have been extensively quoted here for 
the concise insight they provide into the issue.
5 Ibidem, p. 6.
6 See United States v. Rogers, decided in 1846, where the Court held that a white man who 
had voluntarily moved to the Cherokee Nation in the Indian Territory and who had become e 
member of the tribe ”is still a white man, of the white race”. It was irrelevant to the Court that 
this man was adopted into the Indian tribe. It decided that he was going to be prosecuted in 
federal court, although provisions in the federal jurisdictional statutes excepted intra-Indian 
crimes from federal court jurisdiction. 
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Fur ther com pli ca tions are due to con gres sional de ter mi na tion of who is an In-
dian tribe or who is an In dian in rec og ni tion of Con gress’ broad power to regu late 
In dian af fairs1. And courts have ”his tori cally been def er en tial” to con gres sional de-
ter mi na tion2. Ad di tion ally, the Su preme Court’s re cent prac tice has be gun to 
equate the term ”In dian” with ”tribal mem ber”3.
How ever, what cer tainly stays as a con clu sion within the fed eral pol icy frame-
work is that these con cepts are pri mar ily a mat ter of in ter pre ta tion. If the term 
”mem ber ship” is used as part of con gres sional power to con trol the prop erty of In-
dian tribes, the con gres sional defi ni tion will gov ern, while if it is part of a stat ute 
de signed to strengthen or to pro tect tribal sov er eignty, the tribal defi ni tion must 
be as cen dant4. The mod ern con gres sional trend is to de fine the term ”In dian” 
broadly to in clude both for mal and in for mal mem ber ship as well as re quire ments 
of a ”cer tain de gree” of In dian blood5.
An other im por tant is sue of In dian iden tity is the defi ni tion of ”In dian coun-
try”. This term has been used in many senses. The ”most use ful” de scrip tion might 
be ”a coun try within which fed eral laws re lat ing to In di ans and tribal laws and cus-
toms gen er ally are ap pli ca ble”6. Cohen’s note speci fies that these are lands oc cu pied 
by In di ans to which their ti tle or right of oc cu pancy has not been ex tin guished.
We can find here a still un touched sense of tribal sov er eignty. Mean while, the 
con cep tion that In dian coun try re flected a situa tion, ”which found its coun ter part 
in In ter na tional law in the case of newly ac quired ter ri to ries”, can not avoid a main 
con se quence: the very fact that the laws of these ter ri to ries con tin ued in force un til 
re peated or modi fied by the new sov er eign”7.
How ever, the whole ”most in tri cate” prob lem in the field of In dian law – In-
dian ti tle – is ig nored in this per spec tive. Im posed by the ”sin gle ex cep tion of ir re-
sisti ble power” such per spec tive il lus trates the dis tance be tween the mean ing of a 
prin ci ple and its de facto ap pli ca tion.
In dian iden tity be comes a cru cial is sue in cases like Em ploy ment Di vi sion, De-
part ment of Hu man Re sources of Ore gon v. Smith, de cided in 1990, Pe yote Way of God 
Church v. Thorn burgh, de cided in 1991, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Mar ti nez or United 
States v. Dion, de cided in 1986. Mean while, any In dian case touches – di rectly or in-
di rectly – the idea of In dian iden tity, cre at ing le gal con cepts and en forc ing them 
by later prac tice.
The ques tion in Smith was whether the Free Ex er cise Clause of the First Amend-
ment per mits the State of Ore gon to in clude ”re li gious in spired” pe yote use within 
the reach of its gen eral pro hi bi tion on use of that drug and whether this per mits 
the State to deny un em ploy ment bene fits to per sons dis missed from their jobs be-
cause of such re lig iously in spired use.
The First Amend ment ex cludes all gov ern ment regu la tion of re li gious be liefs 
as such. Re spon dent in this case were fired from their jobs with a pri vate drug 
1 This is why ”justice can be done” to some extent only for ”federally recognized tribes”, 
while the non-recognized ones have to fight for their self-defined sense of identity. 
2 See R. CLINTON, N. NEWTON, M. PRICE, American Indian Law, cit., pp. 86-87.
3 Not to mention that there is a vast difference between what a concept means and how it is 
interpreted in a programmatic sense. 
4 Ibidem, p. 86.
5 Ibidem.
6 Ibidem, p. 13. 
7 Felix COHEN, Federal Indian Law, cit., p. 15.
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reha bili ta tion or gani za tion be cause thy in gested pe yote for sac ra men tal pur poses 
at a cere mony of the Na tive Ameri can Church, of which both were mem bers. They 
con tended that their re li gious prac tices mo ti va tion for us ing pe yote ”places them 
be yond the reach of crimi nal law that is not spe cifi cally di rected at their re li gious 
prac tice and that is con ced edly con sti tu tional as ap plied to those who use the 
drug for other rea sons”1. But the Su preme Court’s mo ti va tion was writ ten from 
the point of view of the Ameri can na tion as a ”melt ing pot”. It ar gued that:
”Be cause we are a cos mo poli tan na tion made up of peo ple of al most 
every con ceiv able re li gious pref er ence […] we can not af ford the lux ury of 
deem ing pre sump tively in va lid, as ap plied to the re li gious ob jec tor, every 
regu la tion of con duct that does not pro tect an in ter est of the high est or der”2.
Such ra tion ale im plied that the rule ”re spon dent’s fa vor” would open the pros-
pect of con sti tu tion ally re quired re li gious ex emp tions from civic ob li ga tions of ”al-
most every kind”. While in vok ing that ”val ues have to be pro tected from gov ern ment 
in ter fer ence”, the Court none the less did not con sider that this par ticu lar prac tice 
was cen tral to the In dian be lief, and that the use of pe yote was the very es sence of 
the re li gious ser vice, since it had the sense of a sac ra ment. The In dian pan the is tic 
tra di tion is ig nored here; mean while, value judg ments are made on how ”cen tral” 
a cer tain prac tice is for a spe cific re li gious be lief3.
In Pe yote Way Church of God v. Thorn burgh, the court held that fed eral ex emp-
tion of mem bers of Na tive Ameri can Church from stat utes pro hib it ing pe yote pos-
ses sion ef fected a ”po liti cal, rather than ra cial” clas si fi ca tion. None the less, the use 
of pe yote was lim ited to Na tive Ameri can mem bers who had at least 25% na tive 
Ameri can an ces try. Since fed eral ex emp tion was ”ra tion ally re lated” to the pres er-
va tion of Na tive Ameri can cul ture, the fact that the non-In dian prac ti tio ners of the 
Pe yote Way of Got Church were good-faith be liev ers in us ing pe yote as a sac ra-
ment was not rele vant to the court’s de ci sion.
It was only in 1994 that Con gress passed the Ameri can In dian Re li gious Free dom 
Act Amend ments le gal iz ing the use of pe yote as long as it was ”con nected to a tra di-
tional In dian re li gious rit ual”, thereby ad mit ting that pe yote use in this con text 
was not of a rec rea tional na ture. Fi nally, it seemed to be un der stood that pe yote 
was nec es sary for hu man ac cess to sa cred ness through prayer: a way of tran scend-
ing the ”nor mal ity” of or di nary life. To use the drug was defi nitely ”cen tral to the 
re li gious prac tice”, since it cre ated ac cess to a world that ex isted as a di men sion of 
in ter nal ex peri ence and peace.
The Pe yote Way Church of God v. Thorn burgh case is an es sen tial ex am ple for the 
long-term im pli ca tions caused by the im po si tion of one sys tem of val ues over an-
other. The pass ing of the Ameri can In dian Re li gious Free dom Act of 1978 in tended to 
pro tect tra di tional In dian re li gious ac tiv ity. But, as shown in Lyng v. North west In dian 
Ceme tery Pro tec tive As so cia tion (1988), ef forts to in voke the Act to limit fed eral poli-
cies ad versely af fect ing In dian Ac cess to re li gious sites have proven un suc cess ful4. 
1 R. CLINTON, N. NEWTON, M. PRICE, American Indian Law, cit., p. 48. 
2 Ibidem, p. 53.
3 For similar issues see Frank v. Alaska, where the Supreme Court o Alaska  held that fresh 
moose meat consumption by the Athabascan Indians – a very important part of the religious 
funeral feast given in honor of a deceased member – was not ”central” to a religious observance.
4 See ”Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Association”, in R. CLINTON, N. NEWTON, 
M. PRICE, American Indian Law, cit., pp. 68-79.
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The Su preme Court in this case de cided that the First Amend ment’s Free Ex er cise 
Clause does not for bid the gov ern ment from per mit ting tim ber har vest ing in, or 
con struct ing a road through, a por tion of a Na tional For est that has tra di tion ally 
been used for re li gious pur poses by mem bers of three Ameri can tribes in north-
west ern Cali for nia. It must have been dif fi cult to ad mit that, in ”marked con trast” 
to west ern re lig ions, the be liefs sys tems of Na tive Ameri can do not rely on doc-
trines, creeds, or dog mas. Unlike in west ern re lig ions, ”uni ver sal truths” play no 
role in Na tive Ameri can faith. Re li gious cere mo nies were es sen tial in Na tive 
Ameri can so ci ety, be cause their role was not to ”ex plain the natu ral world or to en 
lighten in di vid ual be liev ers, but to pro tect and en hance the tribal ex is tence”1. 
Land is es sen tial for In dian re li gious prac tice; given its site-spe cific na ture, the 
prac ti tio ner has to be sur rounded by un dis turbed natu ral ness. Com men tar ies or 
in ter pre ta tions of the ritu als them selves are an ab so lute vio la tion of the cere mo-
nies; there fore, it was ob vi ous that the pro posed con struc tion ac tivi ties in this case 
would de stroy prac ti tio ners’ re lig ion and force them to aban don the ritu als.
It is pain ful to men tion the most re spect less ac tions that have been done and 
are be ing done against In dian civi li za tion. This is (mainly but not ex clu sively) be-
cause they in volve the sa cred value of the dead. It is the most (un)be liev able situa-
tion of the dese cra tion of the dead. But, as it has been said many times in his tory, 
the liv ing are here in or der to tell the story. And as Wal ter Echo Hawk, a law yer 
with the Na tive Ameri can Rights Found writes:
”It’s a real clash be tween sci ence and re lig ion […] If you dese crate an 
In dian grave, you get a Ph.D. But if you dese crate a white grave, you wind 
up sit ting in prison”2.
The same ethno-cen tric logic is found in Bear Lodge Mul ti ple Use As so cia tion v. 
Babitt, de cided in 1998. It is hard for any one em bed ded into Euro-Chris tian tra di-
tion to com pre hend that, in Na tive Ameri can world, a dis tinc tion be tween re lig-
ion and cul ture is hardly pos si ble. Par ticu larly in this case, it was dif fi cult to ad mit 
the fact that Ameri can In di ans con sid ered the ”Devil’s Tower” in Wyo ming a sa-
cred site. In di ans had a sense of natu ral the ol ogy that es tab lished a sense of sa cred-
ness in place and tra di tion.
One has to add that, to day, the ”ex otic na ture” of the tribal re lig ions is about 
all that can at tract white tour ists to the res er va tions. As Deloria rightly ob serves, 
since the In dian Chris tians ”are not ex pected to hold church ser vices as a tourist at-
trac tion, tra di tional In di ans should not be lieve that they are re quired to do so”3.
An other rele vant case is Santa Clara Pueblo v. Mar ti nez. A cru cial con cept – 
mem ber ship – is in volved in this case. From the In dian’s point of view, mem ber-
ship in an In dian tribe was not a right cre ated by the Con sti tu tion, laws or trea ties 
of the United States: it was an in sti tu tion that pre dated dis cov ery, there fore re lated 
to tribal in her ent sov er eignty. Re spon dent Mar ti nez in this case was a full-blooded 
mem ber of the Santa Clara Pueblo, re sid ing on the Santa Clara Pueblo res er va tion 
in North ern New Mex ico. She mar ried a Na vajo In dian, with whom she had sev-
eral chil dren, in clud ing re spon dent Aud rey Mar ti nez. Two years be fore their mar-
riage, the Pueblo passed a mem ber ship or di nance ac cord ing to which the Mar ti nez 
1 See ibidem, p. 76.
2 Cited in Larry FRUHLING, Gannet News Service, Atlanta, Georgia, April 19, 1989. 
3 Vine DELORIA Jr., Clifford M. LYTLE, The Nations Within...cit., p. 254. 
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chil dren could not be ad mit ted into the Pueblo tribe be cause their fa ther is not a 
Santa Cla ran. Mean while, the chil dren could not be ac cepted into the Na vajo tribe, 
be cause their mother was a Pueblo.
The le gal is sues in volved are more com pli cated, how ever, since they in volve 
the ef fects of the In dian Civil Rights Act. Re spon dents claimed that such tribal rules 
dis crimi nate on the ba sis of sex and an ces try in vio la tion of Ti tle I of the Act, which 
pro vides that ”no In dian tribe in ex er cis ing pow ers of self-gov ern ment shall deny 
[…] any per son within its ju ris dic tion the equal pro tec tion of its laws”. But the 
court held that Ti tle I does not au thor ize the bring ing of civil ac tions for de clara-
tory or in junc tive re lief to en force its sub stan tive pro vi sions, thereby not in ter fer-
ing with the tribal rules on mem ber ship. Cases like United States v. Ma zu rie and 
Wil liam v. Lee are cited here. In dian tribes have long been rec og nized as pos sess ing 
the com mon-law im mu nity from suit en joyed by sov er eign pow ers. Al though this 
as pect is sub ject to the ”ple nary con trol” of Con gress, one has to con sider that In-
dian na tions are ex empt from suit ”with out con gres sional au thori za tion”.
A very in ter est ing case is United States v. Dion. It in volves es sen tial as pects of 
In dian iden tity:
Dion, a mem ber of the Yank ton Sioux Tribe, was con victed of shoot ing four 
bald ea gles on the Yank ton Sioux res er va tion in South Da kota in vio la tion of the 
En dan gered Spe cies Act. This act pro hib its the hunt ing of the bald or golden ea gle ex-
cept pur su ant to a per mit is sued by the Sec re tary of the In te rior. On the other 
hand, mem bers of the Yank ton Sioux tribe had a treaty right to hunt ea gles within 
their res er va tion for non com mer cial pur poses1.
The ques tion in this case was whether the Ea gle Pro tec tion and En dan gered Spe-
cies Act ab ro gate this treaty right. Al though, be fore the case was de cided, Con-
gress’ in ten tion to ab ro gate In dian treaty rights had to be ”clear and plain”, and 
al though the Act did not con tain any ex plicit ref er ence to In di ans, the Court read 
the stat ute ”as hav ing ab ro gated that right”.
The de mand for ea gle feath ers for In dian re li gious cere mo nies was in ter-
preted as a threat to the con tin ued sur vival of the golden ea gle2. ”Con gress shows 
to set a re gime in which the Sec re tary of the In te rior had con trol over In dian hunt-
ing, rather than one in which In dian on-res er va tion hunt ing was un re stricted.”3 
We can see from this case how ”con gres sional in tent” started to be de fined in an 
im plicit sense. The courts’ prac tice sup ported the modi fi ca tion of In dian rights in 
a much mare sub stan tial way.
The ef fects of this case have largely de stroyed In dian iden tity. The rights guar an-
teed to In di ans by treaty and stat ute were of ten se cured in ex change for large ces sion 
of land or other rights by the In di ans. Many of the treaty and statu tory rights in-
volved vested prop erty rights for which com pen sa tion must be paid un der the Fifth 
Amend ment, should the na tional gov ern ment ab ro gate the right. The re quire ment 
of a clear and con gres sional in tent to in fringe such rights must have given them a 
sense of se cu rity at least con cern ing the rights re tained by ne go ti ated trea ties.
1 It has to be remembered that hunting and fishing rights are ”reserved rights” for the 
Indians. Federal Indian Law has recognized the importance of these activities to traditional Indian 
cultures. These rights were part of continuing an ancient way of life ”after the establishment of 
the sovereign”.
2 For a contrary view, see the Cherokee’s oral history, which contains many stories in which 
animals worry about the land becoming too crowded with human beings. 
3 R. CLINTON, N. NEWTON, M. PRICE, American Indian Law, cit., p. 222. 
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In the Arapa hoe tra di tion, ea gles arte seen as mes sen gers,
”tran si tory be tween heaven and earth, car ry ing prayers to the Man Above. 
This ex plains the im por tance of ea gles plum age in the Sun Dance re ga lia, 
and simi larly of the la bel ’ea gles’ for the old men who sing re li gious songs as 
prayers on be half of the peo ple”1.
United States v. Dion al lows a deeper in sight into the way In di ans per ceived and 
wor shipped na ture. Only such a per spec tive can give a bet ter sense of the de struc-
tion re sulted from di ver gent de ci sions on In dian is sues, both le gal and po liti cal.
Also some au thors have ”rhap so dized” about the gran deur of In dian cul ture 
and about the sa cred sense of na ture found in this cul ture, it is none the less nec es-
sary to un der stand the earth from a Na tive Ameri can per spec tive in or der to per-
ceive then im pact of the en vi ron mental cri sis on Na tive Ameri cans. Their 
per spec tive is to tally dif fer ent from then utili tar ian view on re sources em bed ded 
in the Euro-Ameri can world. Ameri can in dus tri al ism ”in vades the last en claves of 
ecol ogi cally in de pend ent Na tive Amer ica”, a si lent drama es pe cially if one con sid-
ers that the con cept of pro gress is for eign to many Ameri can In dian cul tures. ”Ecol-
ogy and land” are in ti mately con nected with Na tive Ameri can spiri tu al ity: the 
earth is a sa cred space, ”as pro vider for the liv ing and as shrine for the dead”2. Tu-
hulkutsut, a Nez Perce chief, has said that the earth is part his body: ”I be long to 
the land out which I came. The earth is my mother”3. This sense of wor ship is es pe-
cially true for the part of the earth de fined as home4.
The de struc tion of the en vi ron ment is an ex is ten tial drama for Na tive Ameri-
can cul tures. While other groups of peo ple might have be come ”ac cus tomed” to 
pol lu tion, for abo rigi nal peo ple it means death. To day, they can only re mem ber 
the times when earth was boun ti ful, and we were sur rounded with the bless ings 
of the Great Mys tery, as Lu ther Stand ing Bear has said in one of his fa mous words, 
trans mit ted by oral cul ture.
In this con text, one can not for get the power of re li gious re sis tance in tribal so-
cie ties dur ing the cen tu ries of op pres sion. As the Ro ma nian phi loso pher Mircea 
Eli ade states, ”the sha manic vi sion is a uni ver sal hu man ex peri ence, but it tends to 
be an over all uni fy ing force only in tribal so cie ties”5.
Go ing back to the ini tial ques tion which mo ti vated this study, Ameri can In dian 
Law will re flect In dian iden tity to the ex tent to which the shared sense of jus tice 
will be come re al ity. Other ar gu ments are no more than soph is try.
1 Ibidem, p. 381. 
2 On the unique problem of Indian remains, see Mexican v. Circle Bear (1985), a case dealing 
with the great respect for human remains in Indian cultures; The Indian Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act of 1990; Connie HART YELLOWMAN, ”Naevahoo’ohtseme – We are Going Back 
Home: The Cheyenne Repatriation of Human Remains – A Woman’s Perspective”, St. Thomas 
Law Review, 9, 1996, p. 103.
3 D. GRINDE, B. JOHANSEN, Ecocide of Native America, cit., p. 31. 
4 For an extensive description of the Native American environmental ethic and environmental 
philosophy, see D. GRINDE, B. JOHANSEN, ”Native Americans: America’s First Ecologists?”, in 
IDEM, Ecocide of Native America, cit., pp. 23-52.
5 See Mircea ELIADE, The Sacred and the Profane, Harcourt, Inc., Orlando, Florida, 1957, 
and IDEM, Shamanism: Archaic Technics of Ecstasy, Bolingen Series, New York, 1964. For such an 
application to the Pueblos, see Alfonso ORTIZ, The Tewa World, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1969.
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Sto ries of ca tas tro phe and re newal are both found in the Na tive Ameri can 
leg end. But from a con tem po rary van tage, one story is par ticu larly rele vant to 
the current situa tion of the Ameri can In dian. It comes from the Wappo peo ple of 
North ern Cali for nia:
”Long ago there was a great flood which de stroyed all the peo ple in the 
world. Only Coy ote sur vived. When wa ters sub sided, the earth was empty. 
Coy ote thought about it a long time.
The Coy ote col lected a great bun dle of tail feath ers from owls, hawks, 
ea gles and buz zards. He jour neyed over the whole earth and care fully lo-
cated the site of each In dian vil lage. Where the dwell ings had stood, he 
planted a feather in the ground and scraped out the dirt around it. The feath-
ers sprouted like trees, and grew up and branched. At least they turned into 
men and women.
So the world be came in hab ited with peo ple again”1.
If the In dian’s per cep tion about cy clic cos mic time is ac cu rate, than In dian re-
newal will re sem ble the end of the Wappo story: ”He planted feath ers sprout out 
into men and women, who again in hab ited the earth”. But such re gen era tion – 
which pain fully re sem bles the col ors of the fi nal scene in Spiel berg’s Schindler’s 
List – would not have been pos si ble if Coy ote would not have thought about it 
”for a long time”. This time of re flec tion is here now. We might still live on the 
age of dis cov ery.
1 As quoted in Carol GOLDBERG-AMBROSE’s ”Introduction” to IDEM, Planting Tail Feathers. 
Tribal Survival and Public Law 280, Los Angeles University Press, Los Angeles, 1997. 
